Takeover law to protect shareholders: Increasing efficiency or merely redistributing gains? by Wang, Ying & Lahr, Henry
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Takeover law to protect shareholders: Increasing
efficiency or merely redistributing gains?
Journal Item
How to cite:
Wang, Ying and Lahr, Henry (2017). Takeover law to protect shareholders: Increasing efficiency or merely
redistributing gains? Journal of Corporate Finance, 43 pp. 288–315.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.007
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
1 
 
Takeover law to protect shareholders: Increasing efficiency or merely 
redistributing gains? 
 
Ying Wanga,*, Henry Lahrb,† 
a Lord Ashcroft International Business School, Anglia Ruskin University, United Kingdom 
b Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom and The Open University, 
United Kingdom 
January 2017 
Accepted manuscript. Please cite as: Wang, Y., Lahr, H., Takeover law to protect shareholders: 
Increasing efficiency or merely redistributing gains? J. Corp. Finance (2017), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.007 
 
Abstract 
We construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal provisions and 
empirically examine the effect of takeover regulation to protect shareholders on shareholder wealth 
for bidders and targets in a multi-country setting. We find that a stricter takeover law increases the 
wealth gains to the shareholders of the combined bidder and target firm, which suggests that 
stronger shareholder protection in the takeover bid process increases the efficiency of the takeover 
market. In contrast to our hypothesis, results show that stricter takeover law does not hurt bidders. 
Its effect on target announcement returns is significantly positive and economically large. Our 
findings on individual provisions suggest that the mandatory bid rule and ownership disclosure 
increase overall synergistic gains in takeovers, whilst the fair-price rule and squeeze-out rights may 
reduce them. Further results show that stricter takeover regulation increases competition in the 
market for corporate control and reduces the time to successful completion of a takeover bid, which 
explains increased combined wealth gains under stricter takeover regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the US and the UK introduced their first national takeover regulations in the late 1960s, 
policymakers and regulators have aimed to provide a takeover law that protects shareholders in a 
takeover bid whilst facilitating the market for corporate control and maintaining the integrity of 
financial markets. Recently, the development and implementation of the EU Takeover Directive 
(hereafter the Directive)1, which was intended to promote the integration of European capital 
markets and harmonize takeover regulation in Europe, has highlighted the ongoing struggle in 
takeover regulation to find an optimal takeover law that addresses the concerns of member states 
and provides for an efficient market for corporate control (Enriques et al., 2014; Humphery-Jenner, 
2012; Clerc et al., 2012).  
Stricter takeover law, defined as laws and regulations that provide more protection to target 
shareholders in a takeover, has attracted criticism because it increases legal barriers in the market 
for corporate control either by introducing more provisions or making existing rules more stringent. 
It may lead to overall efficiency losses due to higher transaction costs or result in greater agency 
costs and overbidding because of the increased competition among bidders. On the other hand, 
shareholder protection may be a zero-sum game in which increased protection benefits target 
shareholders at the expense of bidders, transferring gains from bidders to targets and leaving total 
synergies unchanged, or increase overall gains from improved deal execution with efficient 
takeover regulation. In this paper, we explore the convergence of takeover regulation in Europe 
towards greater protection of target shareholders and test whether it has improved the efficiency of 
                                                  
1 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, O.J. 2004 
L 142/12. Member states were required to transpose relevant provisions into local law by May 2006. 
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takeovers or increased the potential for value destruction through greater deal complexity or 
entrenched managers – and possibly shifted the allocation of wealth generation from bidder 
shareholders to increasingly protected target shareholders. We further investigate which of the 
main takeover law provisions contribute to these effects. 
The optimality of takeover regulations has been explored from a theoretical perspective and 
through empirical studies using broad shareholder protection indices or time fixed effects. Taking 
a theoretical approach, Bergström and Högfeldt (1997) and Bergström et al. (1997) model the 
impact of the equal bid rule and the mandatory bid rule on the value of the firm and conclude that 
the actual effect of an enactment of these rules may ultimately make the target shareholders less 
wealthy. Martynova and Renneboog (2011a) and Goergen et al. (2005) document how, in the 1990–
2005 period, countries across Europe have caught up with the UK towards the Anglo-American 
system of corporate governance when improving the legal position of shareholders. In their 
empirical examination of cross-border takeovers in the 1993–2001 period, Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008b) find some evidence of a positive effect of shareholder protection on targets 
and an insignificant one on bidders. They obtain these results from broad indices of shareholder 
rights (e.g., appointment rights, decision rights, and transparency) and minority shareholder 
protection (voting and other decision rights, trusteeship rights and rights in the event of a takeover). 
By contrast, Humphery-Jenner (2012) focuses specifically on takeover regulation and finds a 
negative effect on bidder returns when using a more recent sample to estimate the impact of the 
EU Takeover Directive. He attributes this to increased managerial entrenchment in bidders and 
greater legal uncertainty created by the Directive.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that attempt to assess the effects of takeover 
law on total shareholder wealth in targets and bidders combined and separately, estimate the impact 
of individual legal provisions, or control for time and country heterogeneity. The aim of this paper 
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is to fill these gaps by empirically evaluating the efficiency of takeover regulation as a whole as 
well as the effects of individual provisions governing takeover bids on the distribution of wealth in 
takeovers. Examining takeover gains to the shareholders of the combined bidder and target firm 
and identifying the division of such gains are of importance to policymakers and managers because 
the combined gains measure the value creation or destruction resulting from takeovers (Andrade et 
al., 2001). The heterogeneous capital markets in Europe provide an opportunity to explore the 
effects of takeover regulation in a set of countries over time and during a critical phase of the 
development of their capital markets. The available sample of takeovers spans the most active 
period of legal developments in takeover regulation and covers all critical sub-periods over the past 
few decades. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions by identifying whether 
takeover regulation creates or reduces shareholder wealth: (1) Does stricter takeover law reduce 
the combined synergistic gains to shareholders involved in takeovers? (2) Does stricter takeover 
law hurt bidding firms and lead to wealth losses for bidders? (3) Does stricter takeover law protect 
minority shareholders and generate a higher return for target shareholders? (4) Which legal 
provisions matter most in explaining the variation of takeover gains to targets and bidders? 
To answer these questions, we construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected 
data on legal provisions that reflect the evolution and quality of takeover laws in EU economies 
over the 1986–2010 period. The index, which focuses on key takeover law provisions that affect 
the process and the (re-)distribution of wealth in takeovers, includes six provisions: ownership 
disclosure, mandatory bid, fair price for the minority shareholders, squeeze-out rights, sell-out 
rights, and management neutrality. A higher index score represents a more stringent takeover 
regulation in a given country, in other words, a market for corporate control more favorable to 
target shareholders. This is the first study to create a comprehensive and dynamic takeover law 
index, which enables a straightforward comparison and analysis between countries in terms of their 
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market regulations for corporate control transfers. To measure wealth effects, we use 
announcement returns as a proxy for expected wealth generation and wealth transfer in takeovers.  
Results show that stricter takeover regulation increases the total wealth gain for the combined 
firm. Combined announcement returns for bidders and targets increase by 4.5 percentage points 
when transitioning from weak shareholder protection to a high-protection environment, which 
indicates that stricter takeover law facilitates value-enhancing takeovers and improves the 
efficiency of the takeover market. Our empirical investigation of which takeover law provisions 
matter most for this wealth effect shows that the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid 
rule are of crucial importance for achieving higher combined announcement returns. In our further 
examination of the total wealth effects of takeover law for non-UK targets, we find a statistically 
positive and economically stronger effect of our takeover law index, the ownership disclosure rule 
and the mandatory bid rule on the combined announcement returns. The fair price rule and the 
squeeze-out rights rule tend to reduce the total wealth of the combined companies when we exclude 
UK targets. The decreasing effect of the fair price rule provides empirical evidence supporting prior 
studies (e.g., Bergström and Högfeldt, 1997) that argue the equal bid rule makes transactions more 
expensive and may reduce the overall efficiency of the takeover market. 
We find that a stricter takeover regulation does not hurt bidders but benefits targets. Results 
show that a stricter takeover law does not reduce bidders’ returns where previous research that did 
not control for time heterogeneity finds a detrimental effect on acquirers’ performance when 
studying the EU Takeover Directive (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). Stringent takeover regulation 
provides better protection for target shareholders in a takeover bid. Changing takeover regulation 
from the weakest to the strongest shareholder protection, ceteris paribus, is associated with a 25 
percent higher announcement return for target shareholders. This impact is driven primarily by the 
ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule. In contrast to our expectation, the evidence 
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does not support the view that these positive gains for target shareholders come at the expense of 
bidders. Announcement returns to bidders are not significantly lower under a stricter takeover law. 
Furthermore, a mediation test that considers alternative paths from stricter takeover law to higher 
announcement returns suggests that a stricter takeover law may even directly increase 
announcement returns for bidders. 
To further investigate the sources of efficiency gains in the takeover process, we examine the 
likelihood of competing offers being launched, toeholds, and time to completion. Our empirical 
findings suggest that strict takeover law to protect shareholders reduces legal uncertainty and 
generally improves the efficiency of the takeover process. We find that ownership disclosure 
encourages competition in the takeover market, but bidders take precautions by increasing their 
toehold before attempting to acquire a target. The mandatory bid rule reduces the time to successful 
completion of a deal. Notably, the management neutrality rule significantly shortens the time to 
completion.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by constructing a dynamic takeover law index and 
testing the effects of takeover regulation as a whole, as well as individual provisions governing the 
takeover process. Most importantly, the multi-country structure of our takeover law index measures 
the convergence of takeover regulation in Europe and allows us – for the first time – to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in both country and time dimensions. By exploiting differences in 
takeover regulation across countries and through time, we examine the effects of takeover law 
where previous studies were not able to control for country effects due to a lack of a time variation 
in their legal variables of interest (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Nenova, 2003).  
The findings presented in this paper have implications for a range of previous studies. Our 
paper is most closely related to work by Humphery-Jenner (2012), Martynova and Renneboog 
(2011a, 2008b), Bris and Cabolis (2008), Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Nenova (2003). In contrast 
7 
 
to Humphery-Jenner (2012), who uses the EU Directive as a natural experiment, our results show 
that there is no evidence of a negative effect of stricter takeover regulation on bidder announcement 
returns even though our research design includes more legislative changes. Focusing on the 
international convergence of corporate governance and cross-border transactions, Martynova and 
Renneboog’s (2011a, 2008b) minority shareholder protection index includes some of the 
provisions we use in this paper. We contribute to this line of research by providing empirical 
evidence that takeover law – as measured by our index – matters more to shareholder wealth in a 
takeover bid than a broad corporate governance index, by estimating combined wealth effects and 
by answering the question of which individual provisions matter most in takeover regulation. Our 
study also goes beyond the results provided by Bris and Cabolis (2008), Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
and Nenova (2003). We construct a dynamic and focused takeover law index (rather than using a 
static index or the broad cross-sectional corporate governance index by La Porta et al. (1998)), 
examine individual provisions, and estimate their effects on combined-firm announcement returns. 
Our closer examination of the combined wealth effects is particularly important because takeovers 
may redistribute rather than create value (McCahery et al., 2004; Burkart, 1999). Combined with 
an estimation of the sources of efficiency gains in the takeover process, our analyses offer insights 
into the redistributive effects of takeover laws and the implications and impact of takeover 
regulation in practice.  
Our study further contributes to the literature by examining takeover regulation outside the 
United States and has practical implications for takeover policy across countries because US 
antitakeover law is concerned mainly with hostile takeovers (e.g., takeover defenses)2 , while 
                                                  
2 In the context of this paper, state antitakeover regulation is found to be associated with firm value and operating 
performance (Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Daines, 2001; Jahera and Pugh, 1991; Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989, 1995; 
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European takeover regulation emphasizes the protection of minority shareholders (e.g., through the 
mandatory bid rule, see Magnuson, 2009). Our findings also provide insights into similar 
provisions in the US. For example, the Williams Act in the US requires the disclosure of a bidder’s 
identity and the extent of the bidder’s holdings in the target, among other things, once the bidder 
obtains more than a specified percentage of shares. Since this is a regulation at the federal level, 
any effect of the Williams Act would be difficult to distinguish from unobserved time effects. Our 
study of disclosure rules has wider implications for policy makers by adding a country dimension, 
which enables us to isolate the effect of disclosure requirements from unobserved country and time 
effects. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our main hypotheses. 
Section 3 outlines the construction of the takeover law index and discusses the evolution of 
takeover law in the EU. Section 4 introduces our sample and identification strategy. Section 5 
presents the empirical results on synergistic gains to bidders and targets and explores the sources 
of such gains in the takeover process. Robustness analyses are reported in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Takeover regulation has attracted the attention of policymakers, managers, investors and academics 
alike since the early 1980s (e.g., Souther, 2016; Straska and Waller, 2014; Cuñat et al., 2012; Bris 
                                                  
Linn and McConnell, 1983), takeover premiums (Sokolyk, 2011; Comment and Schwert, 1995), announcement returns 
when a firm is planning to adopt or repeal an antitakeover provision at the firm level such as supermajority provisions 
or classified boards (Cuñat et al., 2012; Faleye, 2007; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983), and 
shareholder wealth in defeated takeover bids (Ryngaert and Scholten, 2010). 
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and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Nenova, 2003; 
DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1980). Takeover law regulates the market for 
corporate control, and because of the potential of takeovers to generate synergistic gains and 
redistribute wealth in society, it defines the rights and obligations of the acquiring and target firms, 
such as the requirements of information disclosure, the orderly process of the offer, the terms of 
the bid, the defensive measures available to target managers and the rights of minority shareholders 
in a takeover. 
The aim of an appropriate takeover law is to design an optimal set of rules that balances the 
trade-off between promoting an efficient market for corporate control and protecting the minority 
shareholders in a takeover bid from being taken advantage of by bidders, majority shareholders or 
their own management (McCahery et al., 2004; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003). Prior theoretical and 
empirical work has focused heavily on the mandatory bid rule as the key provision in takeover law 
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003; Nenova, 2003; Bebchuk, 1994), while others 
have studied the impact of ownership disclosure, squeeze-out rights, sell-out rights, and 
management neutrality in takeover regulation (Armour et al., 2007; Bebchuk, 2002; Burkart, 1999; 
Yarrow, 1985). Recognizing the importance of these key provisions, European policymakers aimed 
to harmonize the European takeover market by including them in the EU Takeover Directive. In 
the following sections, we review the prior literature on these provisions and develop hypotheses 
on the impact of takeover law and relevant provisions on shareholder wealth and the distribution 
of synergistic gains in takeovers.  
2.1 Shareholder protection in takeovers 
One objective of takeover regulation is to protect target shareholder interests in the event of an 
attempted takeover. While a strict takeover law that is strongly in favor of target shareholders can 
10 
 
increase takeover barriers for bidders, insufficient shareholder protection might impose losses on 
target shareholders in a takeover bid, especially minority shareholders. Therefore, rational investors 
will demand a larger discount when they invest in a legal system that offers lower takeover 
protection or will abandon the stock market as a whole (Burkart, 1999).  
Strict takeover law provides more opportunities for shareholders to participate in a takeover 
process. Among the key provisions in takeover law, ownership disclosure requires an early 
disclosure of the toehold that potential buyers have acquired in target firms. Where a lax disclosure 
standard allocates more takeover gains to bidders through pre-takeover shareholdings, it comes at 
the expense of target shareholders. A strict disclosure requirement improves the bargaining power 
of shareholders and managers in target firms at the early stage of a takeover because, with the 
relevant information, they can evaluate the bid properly and time the bid to extract a higher 
premium (Schouten and Siems, 2010; Armour et al., 2007). Better information disclosure is also 
likely to increase competition among potential bidders and generate higher takeover returns to 
target shareholders.  
Equal opportunities for all target shareholders and the fair treatment of minority shareholders 
are the most important elements of any takeover law (Goergen et al., 2005). As a key component 
of a takeover law that offers minority shareholders a greater chance to participate in the takeover 
process, the mandatory bid rule requires a bidder to make a tender offer to all outstanding shares 
once the direct or indirect holdings cross a certain threshold of voting rights, which is typically set 
at 30% (e.g., the UK and France have had a threshold of 30% since 1986 and 1992, respectively). 
This rule protects minority shareholders by providing them with an opportunity to exit the 
company, especially when combined with a fair price rule, which normally requires acquirers to 
pay an average historical share price (Ferrarini and Miller, 2010; Goergen et al., 2005; Berglöf and 
Burkart, 2003; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003; Bergström and Högfeldt, 1997; Bebchuk, 1994). A 
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stringent mandatory bid rule thus offers minority shareholders better protection by forcing majority 
shareholders to share takeover gains with minority shareholders. 
The squeeze-out rights rule grants bidders the right to purchase the remaining shares after 
they exceed a certain ownership level. This rule can be used to control the free-rider problem by 
bidders, thereby making value-increasing takeovers feasible (Yarrow, 1985). The counterpart of 
the squeeze-out rights rule is the sell-out rights rule, which offers minority shareholders the right 
to require the majority owner to buy them out at a certain level of shareholding. Sell-out rights 
protect minority shareholders and effectively eliminate the pressure-to-tender problem, shift the 
bargaining power from the bidder to target shareholders and thus prevent all value-decreasing 
takeovers (Goergen et al., 2005; McCahery et al., 2004; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003; Grossman and 
Hart, 1980).  
2.2 Efficiency gains and losses due to takeover law 
Takeover law can affect how synergistic gains generated by takeovers accrue to bidders and targets 
in different ways. The synergistic gains, achieved through increased operational efficiency, 
combined technology or greater market power, will be reflected in the change in the combined 
shareholder wealth of acquirers and targets. While takeover law is designed to ensure an orderly 
takeover process, it may reduce the overall synergistic gains in takeovers by protecting 
shareholders, imposing restrictions, and entrenching the target’s managers. These gains may be 
reduced further by uncertainty with respect to the legal framework or increased compliance costs 
under more complex regulation. 
Stricter takeover law can increase legal barriers and reduce bidder returns by making 
takeovers more expensive. For example, a stringent ownership disclosure standard increases the 
likelihood of competing bidders launching a bid. This potential competition may lead to 
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overbidding in a takeover contest (Burkart, 1999, 1995; Bebchuk, 1982). While a lower ownership 
disclosure threshold benefits target shareholders, it limits the bidder’s profits, as the initial stake in 
a target firm is the primary source of profits for the bidder (Burkart, 1999). This may curb the 
incentive to launch a takeover bid and reduce the frequency of value-enhancing takeovers (Burkart, 
1995), although Betton et al. (2009) argue that a zero initial stake may be optimal in most bids to 
avoid the costs of rejection by the target’s management. 
Despite its positive effects for minority shareholders, the mandatory bid rule may reduce the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control, such as by hampering bidders’ ability to freely 
purchase shares because investors can tender their shares to bidders at the increased share price 
(De La Bruslerie, 2013). It may increase the costs of takeovers and act as an anti-takeover device 
(Enriques, 2004) because it prevents bidders from using coercive bid structures, such as partial bids 
and two-tier bids. Other scholars argue that the mandatory bid rule eliminates inefficient control 
transfers at the cost of discouraging more efficient control transfers (Enriques et al., 2014; Clerc et 
al., 2012; Goergen et al., 2005; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003; Bergström 
and Högfeldt, 1997; Bergström et al., 1997; Bebchuk, 1994). A strict mandatory bid rule – 
especially in combination with a fair price rule – might benefit entrenched managers by 
discouraging value-creating bids and reducing the economic value of a takeover (Humphery-
Jenner, 2012; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003).  
Strict takeover law may directly or indirectly increase transaction costs and agency cost 
because of increasing complexity in the takeover regulation framework. Humphery-Jenner (2012) 
argues that the EU Directive makes takeovers more difficult and time consuming to acquire targets. 
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Therefore, the Directive may entrench managers in the EU and increase the cost of takeovers.3 The 
convergence of shareholder protection in European takeover law may have a similar effect, as 
stricter takeover regulation introduces more rules and sets up stringent provisions that may make 
takeover more expensive and therefore reduces the efficiency of the takeover market. As combined 
gains measure the value creation or destruction generated by takeovers (Andrade et al., 2001), we 
hypothesize that stricter takeover law as a whole increases inefficiencies and reduces combined 
wealth gains to bidders and targets. 4  The alternative hypothesis is that stricter takeover law 
succeeds in its aim to establish a set of rules that balances the conflicts of interests in a takeover 
bid and increases the expected returns to the combined firm.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (efficiency hypothesis): Stricter takeover law to protect shareholders reduces 
the combined wealth to bidder and target shareholders in takeovers. 
 
The ownership disclosure rule, mandatory bid rule, fair price rule, and sell-out rule all directly 
address potential acquisition strategies that transfer takeover gains from minority shareholders to 
acquirers. Stringent regulation to protect shareholders in takeovers will often directly reduce the 
                                                  
3 He uses the EU Directive as an external shock to test the hypothesis that bidders make worse acquisitions as a result 
of the entrenchment of the bidder’s management due to the Directive. Rather than testing this indirect effect on takeover 
efficiency, we test the direct effect of takeover law in the target’s country on bidder and target returns. 
4 Another way to measure the efficiency of takeover regulation is to examine whether strict takeover law curbs the 
incentive of bidders to launch takeover bids or reduces the frequency of value-creation deals. However, it is difficult 
to examine these effects in practice. As these questions are beyond the scope of our study, we will focus on the impact 
of takeover law on shareholder wealth to examine the efficiency of takeover law. 
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acquirer’s return (Bergström and Högfeldt, 1997). This is no surprise, as these rules are designed 
to protect target shareholders from exploitation by bidders. If a country adopts them, we expect 
bidder returns to decrease. Conversely, we expect bidder returns to increase if a country adopts the 
squeeze-out rule. Takeover rules may also affect bidder returns more indirectly. Strict ownership 
disclosure can increase competition among bidders and lead bidders to overpay in a transaction. 
The mandatory bid rule and sell-out rights, for example, may reduce the gains of bidding firms 
indirectly by shifting the bargaining power from the bidder to target shareholders (Goergen et al., 
2005; McCahery et al., 2004). Both mechanisms will result in higher transfer prices. Based on the 
preceding discussion, we posit that stricter takeover law may transfer wealth from bidders to 
targets: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (wealth transfer hypothesis): Stricter takeover law to protect shareholders 
reduces the wealth of bidder shareholders. 
 
Stringent takeover regulation is designed to protect target shareholders from expropriation by 
bidders by increasing information transparency, providing more opportunity for minority 
shareholders to participate in a takeover process and eradicating the pressure-to-tender problem, as 
discussed in Section 2.1. We would thus expect strict takeover law to increase the wealth of target 
shareholders.  
However, the target’s value in a takeover may decrease as a result of the increased agency 
conflicts within the target firm because value is either appropriated by management or lost in 
suboptimal solutions to agency problems. To minimize such agency conflicts in target firms, 
takeover law governs the use of defensive tactics available to the target management in a takeover 
bid. Supporters of the board defense school believe that providing boards with the power to defend 
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themselves in takeovers should be beneficial because takeover defenses are used by the target 
management when they believe the firm has hidden value or when they believe resistance will 
increase the bidding price (Bebchuk, 2002). With better information in an imperfect capital market, 
the management negotiating on behalf of the shareholders prevents coercive bids (Berglöf and 
Burkart, 2003; Bebchuk, 2002). However, with more defensive tactics, target management has 
more opportunities to pursue objectives other than the interests of the shareholders, which could 
reduce the value of a takeover bid and consequently lead to fewer takeovers. Because the agency 
conflict between management and shareholders is particularly pronounced in takeovers, some 
argue that management should not have defensive power in takeover bids (Sokolyk, 2011; Goergen 
et al., 2005; McCahery et al., 2004; Bebchuk, 2002).  
To reduce the agency problem, stricter takeover laws tend to limit the anti-takeover measures 
that target managements might be entitled to use in a takeover bid.5 For example, the management 
neutrality rule requires the target management to obtain the explicit authorization from its 
shareholders before they adopt any defensive actions to frustrate a takeover bid. By reducing the 
defensive measures available to the target management, it makes takeovers less costly and may 
thus increase the efficiency of the takeover market. The management neutrality rule could 
effectively reduce agency conflicts in a takeover and increase investor confidence in the acquisition, 
which may lead to higher returns to target shareholders. Based on our discussion of shareholder 
protection in the takeover process, we propose that a stricter takeover law will lead to higher target 
announcement returns.  
 
                                                  
5 State anti-takeover regulation is different in this context due to the history of the US corporate governance system 
and the large proportion of hostile transactions. 
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Hypothesis 3 (shareholder protection hypothesis): Stricter takeover law to protect 
shareholders increases the wealth of target shareholders. 
 
Table 1 summarizes our empirical predictions based on our discussion of takeover law and its 
key provisions. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
3. Constructing a takeover law index 
Takeover laws vary significantly between countries and over time.6 In the past three decades, the 
implementation of the EU Takeover Directive may be seen as the single most important 
development in EU takeover law. As discussed in Section 2, we focus our investigation on the main 
provisions included in the Directive when constructing the takeover law index.7 Focusing on these 
                                                  
6 For example, the Takeover Code in the UK includes 271 pages and numerous provisions within 38 main takeover 
rules in 2006, while the Takeover Act in Germany consists of 8 main takeover articles in 2006. 
7 Key provisions promulgated by the Directive are the mandatory bid rule (Article 5.1), equitable price (Article 5.4), 
disclosure (Article 8.2 and Article 10.1), the obligations of the target board (Article 9.2), the breakthrough rule (Article 
11), the squeeze-out rule (Article 15) and sell-out rights (Article 16). Among these key provisions, board neutrality 
and the breakthrough rule are the most controversial provisions, where Article 12 allows member states to adopt them 
as optional arrangements. Whereas 19 EU member states have implemented the board neutrality rule (Article 9) of the 
Directive, only three member states have adopted the breakthrough rule (Article 11). The breakthrough rule allows 
transfer restrictions become void during a takeover bid. It provides rights to the bidder to void voting restrictions and 
limit multiple-vote securities. According to the Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, only three 
countries – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – had adopted the breakthrough rule as an optional arrangement for their 
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provisions will also provide direct evidence of the convergence of takeover regulation in Europe 
in general and as a result of the EU Takeover Directive in particular. 
To capture country-level regulation that is most relevant in the event of a takeover attempt 
and to enable a direct and systematic comparison of takeover law through time and across countries, 
we construct a takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal provisions. Specifically, the 
index measures whether a country has implemented ownership disclosure requirements8 , the 
mandatory bid rule, the fair price rule for minority shareholders, squeeze-out rights for the bidder, 
sell-out rights for target shareholders, and the management neutrality rule. These six legal 
provisions, which are regulated by the Directive and identified in the literature as important for the 
regulation of takeovers (see Section 2), are critical in a takeover bid because they directly determine 
the bidder’s incentive to make a takeover bid and the target’s acceptance of a bid, as well as the 
distribution of any takeover gains. With the exception of Nenova’s (2003)9 static cross-sectional 
indices for the development of takeover law, no indices exist that comprehensively and specifically 
capture takeover regulations.10 We construct the index in a dynamic form because the dynamic 
                                                  
companies by June 2012. Due to the limited adoption of the breakthrough rule in Europe, we exclude it from the 
construction of our takeover law index. 
8 For example, EU decisions gradually eliminated the differences in national legislation and harmonized the regulation 
of ownership disclosure in European countries, particularly Directive 88/627/EEC, Directive 2001/34/EC and 
Directive 2004/109/EC. 
9 Nenova (2003) examines the control block premium by considering the impact of takeover regulation, where takeover 
regulation is proxied by three variables in 1997. 
10 The governance index developed by Martynova and Renneboog (2011a) contains some of the provisions studied in 
this paper but encompasses a much broader range of governance variables that are not relevant in the takeover process. 
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nature of our index is crucial for the identification of economic effects distinct from unobserved 
cross-sectional country effects.  
Another complex issue in coding and weighting any legal rules is to what extent we should 
code a rule to reflect the diversity and quality of the rules. The six takeover law provisions in the 
index evolve over time and present great variation. To capture the complexity of takeover law 
provisions and the effect of the rules in practice, individual takeover law provisions are normalized 
in the range from zero to one with intermediate values whenever we can distinguish them. For 
example, following Armour et al. (2007), we set the index component for ownership disclosure 
equal to one if the shareholders have to disclose ownership when owning at least 3 percent of the 
company's capital, equal to 0.75 if this threshold is 5 percent, equal to 0.5 for a 10 percent threshold, 
equal to 0.25 if the threshold is 25 percent and zero otherwise. Table 2 defines the coding of 
takeover law provisions. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
We hand-collect the raw legal data directly from the primary legislation in a given country 
(i.e., takeover laws and regulation, companies law, securities laws, stock exchange regulations and 
decrees). The legal sources are summarized in Appendix B. Following Nenova (2003) and Armour 
et al. (2007), the takeover law index is calculated as the aggregate of the six takeover law 
components. The squeeze-out rule is weighted negatively (i.e., negative one if there is a squeeze-
out rule in place and zero otherwise) because we expect squeeze-out thresholds defined by law to 
benefit the bidder, contrary to the other takeover law provisions that aim to protect target 
shareholders. This gives a theoretical total range of [−1, 5]. A higher index score represents a 
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stricter takeover law from the bidder’s viewpoint and a more favorable legal environment for target 
shareholders. 
Table 3 shows the development of takeover law in the EU. Our index indicates that takeover 
laws in EU countries have been substantially improved since the late 1980s, especially in terms of 
the protection offered to the minority shareholders. The mean value of the takeover law index for 
the sixteen major European countries was 0.67 (out of a score of 5) in 1986, but it had reached 3.47 
by 2010. In general, there are three major turning points between 1986 and 2010. The first change 
occurred in 1989. Before 1989, only a few countries provided good protection to the target 
shareholders in the case of a takeover bid. The average score of the takeover law index was 0.86 
out of a score of 5 in 1988, in which the highest level of protection was provided by the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden.11  The second change happened in the late 1990s. With the trend of 
globalization and the development of the stock market, more takeover bids occurred after 1996, 
and the number of takeover bids peaked in 2000 (Table 4, Panel B; see also Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011b). Growing takeover activity might have drawn the attention of regulators to the 
                                                  
11 In the UK, takeovers and mergers are self-regulated by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers issued by the 
Takeover Panel. The Panel’s statutory functions are set out in and under Chapter 1 of Part 28 (sections 942 to 965) of 
the Companies Act 2006. Although the City Code has changed in the past three decades, these changes are relatively 
minor as far as our UK takeover law index is concerned. For example, the threshold to trigger the mandatory bid rule 
has been 30% since the first edition of the City Code was published in April 1985. The threshold to trigger the 
mandatory bid rule for any person who holds no less than 30% but not more than 50% when acquiring more voting 
rights was reduced from 2% of the voting rights in 1985 to 1% in 1993. To enable a systematic comparison across 
countries, we focus on the threshold that first triggers the mandatory bid rule. Therefore, the change does not affect the 
score of the UK index. The protection of minority shareholders in Ireland before 1997 is similar to the UK because 
takeovers in Ireland were regulated by the UK City Code before 1997. 
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need to provide an appropriate takeover regulation to facilitate the market for corporate control.12 
Simultaneously, the increased number of takeovers may also have led to a higher demand for a 
takeover law that protects target shareholders.13 The third change took place after 2006 with the 
introduction of the EU Takeover Directive. Its adoption in member states substantially enhanced 
the quality of takeover laws in some countries after 2006 (see Table 14). In 2009, the average 
takeover law index reached its highest level of 3.47 during the sample period. In sum, our takeover 
law index shows that European takeover law has continued to converge towards greater shareholder 
protection. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Data and method 
4.1 Takeover sample 
Our sample of transactions contains all attempted takeovers in EU countries for the period between 
1986 and 2010 from Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum). We include all tender offers, mergers 
and acquisitions but exclude minority stake purchases, leveraged buyouts, privatizations, spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers and repurchases. This specific period is 
selected because takeovers started to be prevalent after the 1986 Single Market Act was signed in 
                                                  
12 For example, based on the experience with the takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone plc, Germany introduced 
its first takeover law in 2002.  
13 During the collection of takeover law provisions, we noticed that there were many letters from the target firms to 
the regulators that required particular protection to the target shareholders. 
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the European Union. It also covers the evolution of takeover regulation in several countries both 
before and after becoming EU member states.  
The sample must meet the following requirements: (1) takeovers, announced between 1986 
and 2010, target EU firms; (2) targets are publicly traded firms in an EU country, while bidders 
can be publicly traded firms in any country; (3) the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target 
shares before the deal and intends to own more than 50 percent of the target firm after the 
transaction; (4) deal value is disclosed and is at least one million US dollars; (5) multiple bids 
announced within 14 days are excluded from the analysis; (6) bid price is available from Thomson 
Financial, LexisNexis or the Financial Times; and (7) share prices are available from Datastream. 
These requirements result in a final sample of 1,273 takeovers involving target firms from the 
sixteen major European countries. The takeover attempts in our sample are made by 969 unique 
bidders with a total deal value of US$2,151 billion and an average of US$1,690 million. 
Firms have been targets of takeover attempts most often in the UK, France and Germany, 
while the largest proportion of bidders are from the UK and the US. As shown in panel B of Table 
4, the takeover market grew slowly until the mid-1990s, developed rapidly after 1997 and peaked 
with the dot-com boom in 2000. After a slight rebound in 2005, the number of takeovers decreased 
again following the global economic recession in 2008.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
4.2 Measure of wealth gains from takeovers 
We use cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs) as dependent variables to measure 
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expected gains to bidders and target shareholders.14 In addition to separate announcement returns 
for bidders and targets, the combined announcement returns for the notional firm consisting of 
targets and bidders are computed by weighting the target’s and acquirer’s announcement returns 
according to their market capitalizations. This procedure assumes that social welfare gains are 
reflected by expected announcement returns to rational, unbiased residual claimants in takeovers, 
excluding other potential stakeholders, such as bondholders, or external effects on the public. 
Descriptive studies reliably find a positive unconditional combined announcement return in 
takeovers (Andrade et al., 2001).  
To estimate returns to shareholders of both firms involved in the takeover, we follow 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) and Faccio et al. (2006) to calculate the CARs over the event 
window of [-2, +2] days around the takeover announcement, where day 0 is the announcement 
date. We employ a market model with local market indices as the benchmark to account for the 
possibility of market fragmentation and because additional factor returns are not available for the 
majority of the countries in our sample. Results for more sophisticated models used in the literature 
usually produce similar results.15 We use main market indices with long time series for each firm 
in order to maximize data availability (e.g., FTSE All Share in the UK, DAX 30 in Germany, and 
SBF 120 in France). Parameters are estimated over the period of 260 to 43 trading days prior to the 
                                                  
14 Studies using share price information to measure the wealth effect of takeovers include Ang and Ismail (2015), Cuñat 
et al. (2012), Sokolyk (2011), Giroud and Mueller (2010), Schouten and Siems (2010), Bris and Cabolis (2008), 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008b), Armour et al. (2007), Faleye (2007), Faccio et al. (2006), Rossi and Volpin (2004), 
Daines (2001), and Comment and Schwert (1995). 
15 See, for example, Cuñat et al. (2012), Sokolyk (2011), Giroud and Mueller (2010), Cable and Holland (1999). 
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takeover announcement. The period between 43 days to 2 days before the announcement is used to 
calculate run-up excess returns. 
To test the combined wealth effects on bidders and targets, we calculate a total CAR weighted 
by the market capitalizations of targets and bidders two days before the announcement date. Panel 
A in Table 4 reports a mean value of the announcement returns for the combined entities of 2.4 
percent, while targets gain 17.3 percent and acquirers earn −0.57 percent on average.16 All mean 
announcement returns are significant at the one percent level.  
4.3 Identification strategy 
Our main models are estimated by ordinary least squares using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors.17 In line with prior studies, we include a battery of deal features18 and firm characteristics19 
into our models to control for other factors that might affect announcement returns. Summary 
statistics for these variables are shown in Panel A of Table 4. Notably, cross-border transactions 
                                                  
16 Faccio et al. (2006) find that acquirers in 17 European countries earn −0.38 percent during the 1996–2001 period, 
but this result is not significantly different from zero. 
17 We find that robust standard errors are more conservative in our models than standard errors clustered by country. 
18 Deal features that have explained takeover returns in previous studies are controlled for in our analysis, namely, 
payment method, hostile deals, diversifying takeovers, toehold and cross-border transactions (Ang and Ismail, 2015; 
Betton et al., 2009; Bauguess et al., 2009; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Faccio et al., 2006; Rossi and Volpin, 
2004; Mitchell et al., 2004; Franks and Mayer, 1996; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
19 We include Tobin’s Q, cash flow, leverage and financial distress in our regression analysis (Alexandridis et al., 
2013; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Faccio et al., 2006; Dong et al., 2006; Moeller et al., 2004; Servaes, 1991; Morck et al., 
1990; Lang et al., 1989). The target pre-announcement run-up stock price, proxied by the target run-up CARs, is also 
controlled in our regressions because it could reflect public information about the takeover, an increase in the target’s 
stand-alone value, or illegal insider trading (King, 2009; Schwert, 1996; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). 
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are frequent in our sample (39 percent), which, to some extent, indicates the integration of the 
European market and the importance of an internationally compatible takeover law. Firm 
accounting data are based on the fiscal year before the takeover announcement. To limit the effect 
of outliers on our estimation results, we winsorize all variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent 
quantiles. Variable definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix A. Appendix C 
reports correlations between our variables. 
We identify the effects of takeover law on announcement returns from country-year variation 
in our key independent variables – the takeover law index and takeover law provisions. Year and 
country effects are included in the models to control for potentially unobserved year and country 
effects. These fixed effects ensure that the remaining country-year variation that is not captured by 
the country and year dummies can be used to estimate the effects of takeover law if we assume that 
the unique variation in country-years is indeed caused by changes in takeover law. At the same 
time, country and time effects purge variation unrelated to takeover law – such as macroeconomic 
trends, economic development, non-company legal frameworks or cultural aspects – which may 
improve estimation accuracy.20 Despite the substantial number of control dummies, coefficients 
are well behaved with variance inflation factors below 5, which shows that there is enough variation 
in takeover law to be exploited by our models.  
                                                  
20 Arguably, firm-specific compliance may have some additional explanatory power over country-specific legal 
provisions. Recently, Enriques et al. (2014) argued that takeover regulation should support an effective choice to allow 
individual companies to decide their takeover regime at the company level. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
study due to the limited availability of firm-level data. 
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5. Results 
In this section, we empirically show that stricter takeover law to protect shareholders increases 
overall shareholder wealth. As expected, target shareholders benefit from greater protection. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, however, this gain for target shareholders is not a result of a net transfer 
of wealth from bidders. These results can be explained by takeover regulation that increases the 
efficiency of the takeover process, which benefits both bidders and targets. We further provide 
analyses to investigate the sources of efficiency gains for bidders and targets. 
5.1 Stricter takeover law and total gains for the combined firm 
According to the efficiency hypothesis (hypothesis 1), we expect that stricter takeover law to 
protect shareholders reduces the combined wealth to bidder and target shareholders in takeovers. 
Our findings in Table 5 show that the overall wealth effect of a stricter takeover law on the 
combined announcement returns of bidders and targets is positive and significant. Changing from 
the weakest protection afforded by takeover law (a takeover index of –1) to the strongest one (a 
takeover index of 5) increases the combined announcement returns to bidders and targets by 4.5 
percentage points. This result is inconsistent with our expectation that a stricter takeover law 
reduces shareholder wealth for the combined firm. In other words, stricter takeover laws succeed 
in protecting the welfare of minority shareholders, as well as promoting the efficient allocation of 
productive resources.  
Another question we aim to answer is which legal provisions matter most in explaining the 
variation of synergistic gains to targets and bidders. Among the six takeover law provisions 
analyzed in Table 5, ownership disclosure is the first single takeover law provision in place in most 
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EU countries, followed by the mandatory bid rule.21 The general historical trend is that the squeeze-
out rule, the sell-out rule and the management neutrality rule are introduced at a relatively late stage. 
More specifically, most nations implemented these three provisions during the late 1990s. In order 
to address potential collinearity among provisions and to provide insights into the historical 
development of takeover law, we develop our models stepwise by following the general time order 
of takeover law provisions in which they have been introduced in practice.  
Results for individual takeover law provisions are reported in Table 5 (models 2 to 7).  We 
find that increased combined wealth effects to bidders and targets are associated with the ownership 
disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule at 6.8 and 5.6 percentage points, respectively. Both 
coefficients are significant at the five percent level. Regulation that was introduced later in time, 
such as squeeze-out or sell-out rights, has no detectable effect on total shareholder wealth gains. 
The positive effect of the ownership disclosure rule on combined wealth gains suggests that 
potential overbidding (Burkart, 1995, 1999) does not diminish the efficiency of the market for 
corporate control (see section 5.2.1). Our results further support the positive relationship between 
investor protection through disclosure and financial market development found in the literature 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009). In addition, the empirical finding on the mandatory bid rule supports the 
view that the mandatory bid rule increases the efficiency of the takeover market by generating 
                                                  
21 The statistics of the takeover law provisions, not reported, show that 44% of the EU countries have the ownership 
disclosure provision as their first single takeover regulation. If we consider a joint implementation of ownership 
disclosure as their first takeover rule, this number rises to 88%. Furthermore, we find that, even though only 6% of the 
EU countries implement the mandatory bid rule provision as their first single takeover rule, the joint implementation 
of the mandatory bid rule is 44%.  
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value-creating bids (De La Bruslerie, 2013; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003) rather than destroying firm 
value (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
While the effect of takeover law on combined shareholder wealth is positive and significant 
in the whole sample of takeovers, Table 3 draws attention to the development of takeover law in 
the UK: Amongst the sixteen major European countries, the UK provides relatively high protection 
for minority shareholders throughout the sample period and – because of its relatively large 
contribution to our sample of takeovers – may have a large impact on our results. In addition, 
because our identification strategy relies on country-year variation, one might suspect that the 
results are driven by takeover law in the UK or by the dominance of UK targets in our dataset. To 
estimate the contribution to the combined shareholder wealth in other countries that undertake 
major developments of their takeover regulation in the past three decades, we analyze a takeover 
sample that excludes UK targets and drop the corresponding UK country effect from the models. 
The total wealth effect of a stricter takeover law reported in Table 6 is consistent with the 
findings in Table 5 but highly statistically significant and economically larger when we exclude 
UK targets from our analysis. The economic significance of the effect of takeover law increases 
from 4.5 to 6.9 percentage points for a change from the weakest to the strongest shareholder 
protection regime. The ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule both substantially 
increase the total wealth of the combined company. Notably, the coefficient of the ownership 
disclosure rule increases from 6.8 percentage points (in Table 5) to 13.6 percentage points (in Table 
6), while the coefficient of the mandatory bid rule rises from 5.6 percentage points (in Table 5) to 
8.5 percentage points (in Table 6). Identification of economic effects of our takeover law index and 
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individual provisions for non-UK targets also validates our main findings, providing stronger 
evidence that stricter takeover law improves the efficiency of takeover process and that our 
takeover law measures capture sufficient country-year variation that is not captured by country or 
year effects alone.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 further reveals some interesting findings regarding the remaining takeover law 
provisions. While Table 5 reports insignificant coefficients for the fair price rule and the squeeze-
out rights rule, Table 6 shows that, when excluding the UK targets, the fair price rule and the 
squeeze-out rights rule significantly reduce the combined wealth gains to bidders and targets. More 
specifically, the fair price rule reduces the combined returns by 5.1 percentage points, whilst the 
gain enjoyed by the combined firm decreases by 4.2 percentage points when the local takeover law 
includes a squeeze-out rule. These findings indicate that stricter takeover law could create the 
opposite of its intended effect in some cases and reduce the overall efficiency of takeovers, as 
discussed by Bergström and Högfeldt (1997).  
Because a substantial part of our results are driven by the ownership disclosure rule, potential 
sample-related effects deserve further investigation. Eckbo and Langohr (1989) report that, after 
France introduced disclosure rules for public tender offers in 1970, takeover premiums increased 
substantially. Although this change happened before the start of our sample period, we run a test 
by excluding French and UK firms from the sample and re-estimate our models. Results for 
combined bidder-target CARs are qualitatively unchanged and quantitatively very similar to those 
in the non-UK models. The effect of the takeover law index is slightly stronger (1.342) and more 
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significant (p<0.01). Effects for individual provisions are also very similar to results reported in 
Table 6. Notably, the squeeze-out rule has a more negative effect (−4.9) on the combined CARs. 
5.2 Do target shareholders capture takeover gains from bidders? 
5.2.1 Does stricter takeover law hurt bidders? 
We hypothesize that stricter takeover law reduces the returns to bidders in a takeover bid because 
target shareholders have more opportunities to free-ride on the bidder’s takeover gains (e.g., due 
to low disclosure thresholds) and more bargaining power under stringent takeover regulation (e.g., 
due to the mandatory bid rule). Contrary to our wealth transfer hypothesis (hypothesis 2), the 
insignificant coefficients in Table 7 suggest that greater shareholder protection does not harm 
bidders in takeovers. Our results are contrary to findings reported by Humphery-Jenner (2012), 
who uses the EU Directive as a natural experiment and finds that it reduces announcement returns 
to bidders. An explanation for this finding is that a dynamic takeover law index across multiple 
countries captures the country-level regulation of the takeover process and enables a design that 
controls for unobserved time effects. When we repeat this test for a sample excluding UK targets, 
we find the same insignificant effect on bidders (in these unreported results, the coefficient for 
takeover law is 0.76 with a standard error of 0.56). 
Since the squeeze-out rights rule gives majority shareholders the right to squeeze out the 
minority shareholders in order to mitigate the free-rider problem, we expect the returns to bidders 
in regimes with squeeze-out rights to be higher than in regimes without squeeze-out rights. 
Interestingly, and contrary to our expectation of a positive relationship between the squeeze-out 
rights rule and bidders’ CARs, the results show a statistically insignificant effect. One may further 
expect that the mandatory bid rule and the sell-out rights rule make transactions more expensive 
for acquiring firms by reducing the pressure on minority shareholders to tender and shifting the 
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bargaining power from the bidder to target shareholders. However, we find no effect of these 
takeover law provisions on bidders’ announcement returns.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
5.2.2 Does stricter takeover law protect target shareholders? 
In this section, we estimate to what extent shareholder protection in takeovers increases the gains 
enjoyed by target shareholders. Regression results of target announcement returns are shown in 
Table 8. Consistent with our shareholder protection hypothesis (hypothesis 3), we find that the 
effect of stricter takeover law on target announcement returns is positive and significant at the one 
percent level. In terms of economic significance, target shareholder returns would be 25 percentage 
points higher under the strictest takeover law than in the weakest protection regime. The results 
provide strong evidence that takeover law protects the rights of target shareholders in a takeover 
bid. 
When investigating the relevance of takeover law, it is instructive to identify the 
heterogeneous impact of takeover law provisions on target announcement returns. We find that 
ownership disclosure significantly increases target announcement returns by 17 percentage points 
when we include all provisions in Table 8. This is in contrast to findings for the US by Malatesta 
and Thompson (1993), who find a reduced effect of the number of acquisition attempts in a given 
period on stock returns after the Williams Act. Our result can be explained by the increased 
transparency of takeovers due to ownership disclosure, which achieves its intended effect and 
protects target shareholders in a takeover bid. The mandatory bid rule, on the other hand, is 
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significant only in the less than fully specified model 3, which includes only the ownership 
disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule but no other provisions.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
We further consider the marginal effect of more takeover law provisions in a legal framework. 
Government regulation of takeovers may exhibit decreasing returns, which become more difficult 
to detect if more rules are added to an existing regulatory framework. We examine this by adding 
the square of the takeover law index to our models and find that effects of this squared index on 
our dependent variables – bidder, target, and combined returns – are all insignificant.22 
5.3 Sources of efficiency gains in the takeover process 
In this section, we explore potential explanations for the observed positive effects of stricter 
takeover regulation grounded in the bargaining power of target shareholders and an overall 
improved efficiency of the takeover process. 
5.3.1 Takeover premiums 
Greater target returns can be a result of the enhanced bargaining power of targets under legal 
regimes with stricter ownership disclosure requirements. This enhanced bargaining position could 
be reflected in larger premiums offered by bidders. If takeover law acts on target returns through 
higher premiums, we expect to find similar effects of ownership disclosure and mandatory bids on 
premiums as on target returns. Similar to Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2013), 
we calculate takeover premiums as the bid price over the share price of the target, using the share 
                                                  
22 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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price on the day before the announcement minus one.23 As shown in panel A of Table 4, the mean 
(median) takeover premium is 31 percent (26 percent) for EU target firms. Similar findings are also 
reported for European targets by Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2013).  
Empirical results are consistent with the expectation that stricter takeover law is associated 
with a higher takeover premium paid to the target shareholders. Model 1 in Table 9 reports a 
significant and positive effect of stricter takeover law on the takeover premium. The economic 
significance of the effect of takeover law is substantial. Changing from the weakest to the strongest 
protection generated by a takeover law increases the takeover premium by 46 percentage points, 
compared with its effect of 25 percentage points on target announcement returns. This increased 
economic effect of our takeover law index suggests that a large proportion of the total effect on 
target announcement returns indirectly results from higher takeover premiums. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Table 9 shows that the mandatory bid rule has the strongest effect on premiums among 
individual takeover provisions, while it is significant in only one model of target announcement 
returns in Table 8. This result is consistent with our expectation, as the mandatory bid rule gives 
the minority shareholders an opportunity to exit the company in the case of a takeover and thus 
increases their bargaining power. In terms of its economic significance, the takeover premium paid 
to the target shareholders is 48 percentage points higher in country-years with a mandatory bid 
                                                  
23 We also test share prices four weeks before the announcement as an alternative denominator. Results are qualitatively 
similar but weaker, as one would expect if the announcement effect is concentrated in a narrow window around the 
announcement day. 
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rule. Our finding is in contrast to the negative effect of the mandatory bid rule on takeover 
premiums found by Rossi and Volpin (2004), potentially because we use a dynamic indicator for 
the mandatory bid rule rather than the static variable in their study and for this reason are able to 
distinguish differences between countries from the reform of takeover law over time. Our results 
thus provide empirical evidence that the mandatory bid rule protects the minority shareholders in 
a takeover bid, as predicted theoretically by Bergström et al. (1997).  
Interestingly, ownership disclosure does not increase takeover premiums, although the 
estimated coefficient is substantial. The insignificant coefficient in our results does not seem to be 
due to this provision’s coding, as the effect is still insignificant when it is coded as a simple binary 
indicator for the presence of a disclosure rule regardless of its threshold. All other provisions leave 
premiums unaffected. Although the squeeze-out and sell-out rules may possibly lead to transfers 
of wealth between tendering and non-tendering target shareholders, they do not change premiums 
offered by bidders.  
5.3.2 Do higher takeover premiums mean higher returns to shareholders? 
Premiums offered by bidders in takeovers should have a proportional effect on expected wealth 
gains to target shareholders, as measured by excess stock returns around the announcement day.  
However, in the previous section, we show that target returns benefit mainly from ownership 
disclosure, whereas premiums are driven mainly by the mandatory bid rule. Reasons for the 
relatively weak link between changes in premiums and changes in announcement returns due to 
takeover law may be found in the likelihood of successful completion of the transaction. A higher 
price offered to target shareholders will correspond to a higher gain only if the offer is not 
withdrawn due to, for example, external factors or anti-takeover action by the target’s management. 
Conversely, final gains to target shareholders may be higher than the original offer price if the 
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bidder is forced to enhance the offer during the takeover negotiation process. To examine the 
relationship between takeover premiums and shareholder wealth gains, we estimate the impact of 
takeover law on takeover success and the mediation effect of premiums. 
If takeover law that leads to higher premiums does not proportionately increase target 
announcement returns, a difference in the probability for a successful takeover might be the reason 
for a differential effect of certain rules on premiums and returns. This theory receives no support 
in our tests (not reported here but available from the authors). Effects on the likelihood of a 
successful takeover are insignificant for ownership disclosure and the mandatory bid rule. 
Therefore, this finding suggests that higher premiums translate directly into wealth gains for target 
shareholders without takeover provisions moderating the likelihood of a successful takeover. We 
do find, however, a weakly significant decrease in the likelihood of success for takeovers under the 
fair price rule, which suggests that this rule makes the takeover process more difficult but at the 
same time leads to offsetting gains elsewhere such that announcement returns for bidders and 
targets are unchanged. Because we do not find effects of variables that affect either premiums or 
target returns, we suspect that the binary nature of our Probit regressions for takeover success leads 
to estimation uncertainty, which makes it challenging to detect small hypothesized effects.  
As an alternative, we estimate the mediation effect of takeover premiums on target returns. 
This allows us to distinguish takeover law provisions that act directly on shareholder wealth from 
those that affect shareholder wealth indirectly through takeover premiums. Our findings in Table 
10 show that takeover law acts on target announcement returns through the takeover premium. The 
competing hypothesis is that takeover law acts directly on target returns. The takeover law index 
satisfies the relevance criterion by significantly predicting takeover premiums, and premiums in 
turn predict announcement returns, with the strongest effect on target returns, as expected. Sobel 
mediation tests are significant for target returns.  
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In our mediation tests for bidder and total shareholder wealth as outcome variables, we find 
both direct and indirect effects of takeover law on combined shareholder wealth. Table 10 shows 
that takeover premiums mediate the effect of takeover law and in turn act on target and combined 
announcement returns. Interestingly, we also detect direct and positive effects of takeover law on 
bidder announcement returns and combined wealth. Premiums show weaker effects on bidder 
returns and combined returns. The Sobel mediation test is significant for combined returns but not 
for bidder returns. Despite the reduced sample size compared with our main models due to missing 
values in the takeover premium, the effect of takeover law on combined returns is significant at the 
five percent level, and its effect on bidder returns is significant at the ten percent level. When we 
repeat these mediation tests for individual provisions (unreported separate regressions), we find 
that ownership disclosure and the mandatory bid rule have a positive direct effect on combined 
returns and bidder returns.  
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
5.3.3 Competing deals, toehold, and time to completion 
Our findings suggest that takeover law has effects on combined returns and bidder gains that cannot 
be explained solely by takeover premiums. What additional factors could drive the positive effects 
of stricter takeover law on the combined entity and targets? In this section, we investigate whether 
stricter takeover law improves the efficiency of the takeover market through a closer examination 
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on competing deals, toehold, and time to completion.24  
Stringent ownership disclosure standards can increase competition among bidders and lead 
bidders to overpay in a transaction. To further examine whether increased target returns are the 
result of improved deal efficiency under stricter takeover law, we estimate models that predict the 
likelihood of a proposed deal being challenged by a second bidder. Competing offers usually 
enhance the target’s bargaining position and should be accompanied by greater returns for target 
shareholders. Supporting our expectation, results in Table 11 show a positive effect of stricter 
ownership disclosure on the likelihood of a rival bidder challenging the deal. This result is in 
agreement with our findings of improved combined and target returns in country-years with 
stringent ownership disclosure in Tables 5, 6, and 8. It suggests that the requirement to disclose the 
bidder’s ownership in the target improves the efficiency of takeovers. In addition, our models 
uncover a positive effect of the fair price rule on the likelihood of a bidding contest, which is 
consistent with the negative effect of the fair price rule that we find in our regression of the 
likelihood of success of takeover attempts under a fair price rule. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
                                                  
24 We thank an anonymous referee for this helpful suggestion. Another transmission mechanism from changes in 
takeover laws to shareholder wealth may be the type of consideration, because the method of payment in M&A 
transactions interacts strongly with the internal and external corporate governance context of a firm (Faccio and 
Masulis, 2005) and affects the announcement returns and premiums paid in these transactions as shown in this paper 
(see also Moeller et al, 2004). We test the effect of takeover law on whether the consideration in a transaction consists 
entirely of cash but find no effect in our sample. 
37 
 
Prior studies suggest that stringent ownership disclosure limits the bidder’s profits, as the 
initial stake in a target firm is the primary source of profits for bidders (Burkart, 1999). Bidders 
seem to be aware of the downsides of having to disclose their stake in the target, which makes 
creeping acquisitions more difficult. While ownership disclosure increases the likelihood of a 
bidding contest, we find in Table 12 that it also increases the bidder’s toehold. A larger toehold 
suggests that bidders try to get into a better bargaining position by holding more target shares in 
anticipation of rival acquirers once their shareholding in the target becomes public knowledge. 
Interestingly, the mandatory bid rule does not seem to increase the bidder’s toehold, which suggests 
that bidders do not increase their toehold in anticipation of free-riding target shareholders but rather 
to protect against other bidders. 
 
[Table 12 about here] 
 
These results explain why announcement returns may be higher under tight ownership 
disclosure requirements. The remaining puzzle is why premiums are not directly affected by 
ownership disclosure. We suspect that the high degree of noise in premium data can offer an 
explanation. Takeover premiums calculated from offer prices in SDC Platinum usually represent 
“final” premiums before the transaction is completed or withdrawn. In some cases involving 
multiple bidders, the final offer price is not recorded for all takeover attempts by competing bidders. 
In effect, the total premium paid to target shareholders is split into several smaller ones – one for 
each competing bidder – that are recorded over time. This underestimates final premiums (i.e., the 
final price paid by the successful bidder relative to the share price before the first bidder’s offer) 
and may thus reduce the estimated effect of takeover law provision that increases the likelihood of 
bidding contests.  
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If stricter takeover law creates more competition among bidders, one might expect that it will 
make takeovers more expensive by increasing the deal completion time. However, the improved 
legal certainty for the parties involved in the transaction under stringent takeover regulation may 
compensate for this negative effect of stricter takeover law on bidder returns. This prediction is 
supported by the overall negative effect of our takeover law index on the time to completion (i.e., 
a positive effect on the hazard rate of successful deal completion) in Table 13. The mandatory bid 
rule reduces the time to successful completion, while the squeeze-out rule lengthens it. The latter 
result can be explained by shareholders that anticipate the possibility of being squeezed out of the 
target firm and draw out the negotiation to secure a favorable outcome. Most importantly, the 
management neutrality rule, which was hotly debated during the negotiations leading to the EU 
Directive, significantly shortens the time to completion. In sum, our additional results suggest that 
takeover law to protect shareholders benefits bidders and targets by reducing legal uncertainty and 
generally improving the efficiency of the takeover process. 
 
[Table 13 about here] 
 
 
6. Other robustness tests 
6.1 The EU Directive as a natural experiment 
To harmonize the EU takeover market and to set up a minimum regulation at the EU level, the EU 
Directive entered into force in May 2004. The Directive may be seen as an exogenous event that 
affects the size and distribution of wealth gains in takeovers. In principle, this event may present 
an opportunity to directly measure the effects of the takeover law index developed in this paper 
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and its constituent legal provisions. The Directive required implementation by member states by 
2006 and affected mainly the mandatory bid rule, the sell-out rights rule and the management 
neutrality rule in EU countries. Table 14 reports the implementation effect of the Directive on the 
takeover law index and takeover law provisions. In 12 out of 16 sample countries, national takeover 
laws were affected by the Directive.  
To test the effect of the EU Directive on takeover announcement returns and premiums, we 
construct a dummy variable that equals one if the takeover was announced on the day and in the 
period after the Directive was implemented in a given country. When we add this dummy to our 
models for target, bidder and combined announcement returns and takeover premiums, the results 
of our takeover law index are consistent with our main results reported in Section 5. However, the 
EU Directive dummy is never significant at the 5% level or better (results not reported here). It 
seems to have a weakly significant (p<0.1) negative effect on premiums. Coefficients remain 
insignificant if we replace the takeover law index with the Directive dummy or remove time effects 
from the regression. In these cases, target announcement returns seem to be positively affected by 
the Directive but are again only weakly significant. 
Our finding on bidder returns is different from Humphery-Jenner’s (2012). Using a dummy 
variable that equals one if the acquisition occurs after 20 May 2006, the implementation deadline 
for the Directive, Humphery-Jenner (2012) reports a significant and negative effect of the Directive 
on bidder returns. In our robustness test in this section, we use the exact date when the Directive 
was implemented in a country but do not find a significant effect of the Directive. The major 
disadvantage of using the EU Directive as a natural experiment is that a dummy variable testing 
the difference in average announcement returns before and after the Directive implementation date 
at the level of the EU (i.e., a time dummy variable using 20 May 2016 as the cut-off date) is 
indistinguishable from unobservable shocks affecting all countries, and almost indistinguishable 
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from time effects in our robustness test, which uses the exact implementation date for each country. 
As a consequence, any time effects that control for such unobserved heterogeneity are highly 
correlated with the EU Directive dummy, making it difficult to disentangle the Directive’s effect 
from unobservable heterogeneity. Because our main research design in this paper uses a long study 
period and includes more such exogenous changes in takeover law, it is able to successfully capture 
the effects of such changes as distinct from random time variation.  
 
[Table 14 about here] 
 
6.2 Investor protection 
The seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998) highlights the importance of investor protection for 
corporate finance. Recently, the effect of investor protection laws on mergers and acquisitions has 
been examined (Danbolt and Maciver, 2012; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Bris and Cabolis, 
2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Other literature has examined wealth effects in mergers and 
acquisitions across countries and over time, as well as in relation to the acquirer’s and target’s 
attributes, such as corporate governance (Harford et al., 2012; Bhagat et al., 2005). To verify the 
contribution of this paper, we test whether existing investor protection indices are able to capture 
a similar degree of variation in announcement returns and premiums as the takeover law index we 
construct. 
As a robustness test, we employ the shareholder rights index and the creditor rights index 
from Martynova and Renneboog (2011a). The shareholder rights index measures the level of 
protection for the shareholders against managerial opportunistic behavior, while the creditor rights 
index measures the protection given to creditors in the case of bankruptcy. Neither of these two 
indices is able to explain announcement returns if added to our main models (model 1 in Tables 5, 
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7, and 8). Both indices are statistically weaker than our takeover law index and only weakly 
significant (p<0.1) in regressions of takeover premiums. While shareholder protection positively 
contributes to premiums, higher creditor protection reduces premiums offered by bidders. Hence, 
the takeover law index may be better able to explain expected returns than broad investor protection 
indices, as our index reflects takeover provisions that matter more in the actual takeover process. 
Higher announcement returns could reflect market expectations of higher net value creation 
when takeovers are completed in an environment with better investor protection. Our results on 
target announcement returns are consistent with the positive effect found by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008b). However, the effect of our takeover law index is significant at p=0.00022 
(model 1 in Table 8), compared with a significance of p=0.005 for their minority shareholder 
protection index (model 5 in Table 9 in their paper). Interestingly, their minority shareholder 
protection index loses its power to explain target returns when they include a general shareholder 
protection index. By contrast, a robustness test using the same shareholder protection index shows 
that our takeover law index significantly increases target returns after controlling for their 
shareholder protection index (see Section 5.2.2). This finding suggests that our specific takeover 
law index that incorporates the most relevant provisions that regulate the takeover process better 
captures the effect of takeover regulation on target announcement returns than a broad corporate 
governance index, such as the minority shareholder protection index and the shareholder protection 
index. 
6.3 Alternative model specifications for individual provisions and control 
variables 
Although our models work well statistically in all regressions, correlations among individual 
provisions in our sample of country-years are substantial because some provisions, such as the 
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mandatory bid and fair price rules, tend to be introduced at the same time. This degree of 
multicollinearity may limit the effectiveness of our models in attributing the effects of individual 
provisions. To safeguard against this concern, we introduce takeover provisions stepwise in our 
main models for announcement returns and premiums. These main results show that, for example, 
the effect of the mandatory bid rule on premiums does not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of 
other provisions, but the results are less clear for provisions introduced later in time. 
While the multicollinearity concern in takeover provisions can be addressed by combining all 
individual provisions in our takeover law index or in principle by increasing the number of country-
year observations, which would go beyond the scope of this paper, we perform an additional test 
to see which single provision has the largest explanatory power and whether adding other 
provisions increases the fit of the model. We build our models starting with the takeover provision 
that has the greatest explanatory power and then adding the next-best provision until the model fit 
does not improve significantly. Quantitative results (not reported here) are similar to our main 
results in Section 5. For regressions of combined announcement returns, ownership disclosure 
contributes the most to the model, in line with the findings in Table 5. Bidder CARs are not affected 
by any provision, again in line with our previous results. For target announcement returns, the fair 
price rule has the largest explanatory power when included as the only provision in the model. The 
mandatory bid rule would also explain a significant part of target CARs but does not contribute 
much in addition to the fair price rule. Finally, the two provisions that significantly contribute to 
the explanation of takeover premiums are the mandatory bid rule and sellout rights. Sellout rights 
did not explain premiums in Table 9 but help explain premiums when added to a model right after 
the mandatory bid rule. 
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7. Conclusion 
The potential for large societal and private wealth gains and losses, combined with its rich history 
and often heterogeneous legal and economic opinions, makes takeover regulation a complex and 
controversial topic among policymakers, managers, investors and academics alike. This study is 
the first to investigate the economic effects of regulation that governs the takeover process using a 
dynamic takeover law index. The time variation in takeover law enables a research design that 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity in both the time and country dimension. It contributes to the 
extant literature on takeovers (e.g., Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011a, 
2008b; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004) by investigating the development of 
takeover laws in European countries and demonstrating empirically how takeover law plays an 
important role in determining wealth gains and transfers in acquisitions.  
The question we address in this paper is to what extent legislative efforts have produced a 
takeover law that approaches a social optimum and whether the changes in takeover regulations 
affect wealth transfers between bidders and targets. We find that stricter takeover law increases the 
combined expected gains from takeovers for bidders and targets. In contrast to Humphery-Jenner 
(2012), our results show that stricter takeover law does not reduce the announcement returns to the 
bidders. Stricter takeover law does not harm bidding firms but balances the trade-off between 
bidders and targets. It protects the rights of the minority shareholders in target firms in the case of 
a takeover by substantially increasing target announcement returns and takeover premiums. Higher 
target returns are not obtained through wealth transfers from bidders but result from higher 
expected net value creation when deals are completed in a high-protection environment.  
The positive wealth effect of takeover law is driven primarily by the mandatory bid rule and 
the ownership disclosure rule. They increase the total gain enjoyed by the combined firm, thus 
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confirming the theoretically predicted positive effect of the mandatory bid rule. Disclosure of 
ownership stakes positively affects announcement returns, which supports the bargaining power 
argument (Schouten and Siems, 2010; Armour et al., 2007), but does not seem to increase 
premiums, contrary to the view that bidders under tight disclosure rules need to win target 
shareholders’ support by offering higher premiums (Burkart, 1995, 1999; Bebchuk, 1982). 
Ownership disclosure facilitates competition among bidders, which in turn is anticipated by bidders 
who increase their stake in the target prior to the bid. There is some evidence that the fair price rule 
and the squeeze-out rights rule may reduce the total wealth of the combined companies. 
Our findings shed light on the importance of takeover regulation and provide practical 
implications for takeover policy around the world. For example, the management neutrality rule, 
which was controversially discussed in the legislative process that led to the EU Takeover Directive, 
shortens the time to successful takeover completion. This apparent improvement in transactional 
efficiency does not affect the combined wealth gains or the distribution of gains between targets 
and bidders. A possible reason for this ambiguous result might be found in a differential impact of 
management neutrality on firms with concentrated and dispersed ownership (Georgen et al., 2005). 
Management neutrality may also affect the occurrence of takeovers. Since an estimation of 
takeover frequency is beyond the scope of this paper, future research may complete the picture and 
investigate whether a stricter takeover law discourages bids and whether this reduces the overall 
beneficial effect of takeover regulation that we find. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Age Age is the number of years on the day of the announcement since the firm was first covered by the 
stock exchange in a given country. Source: Datastream and Worldscope.  
CARs Bidder and target CARs are the cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs) of the bidding 
and target firms, calculated as the CARs over the event window of [-2, +2] days around the 
takeover announcement, where day 0 is the announcement date. Combined CARs are calculated 
as target CAR plus bidder CAR, weighted by their respective currency-adjusted market 
capitalization two days before the announcement. Target, bidder, and combined CARs are 
presented in percentage points to obtain reasonably scaled coefficients in our models. Abnormal 
returns are calculated using the market model, where the market index is a major local index. 
Parameters of the market model are estimated over the period of 260 to 43 trading days prior to 
the takeover announcement. Penny stocks whose price is below one main unit of local currency 
for more than 25 percent of all price observations are excluded, as are stocks with fewer than 30 
return observations. Source: Datastream. 
CAR run-up Stock price run-up is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target firm over 
the window [-42, -3] prior to the takeover announcement, where day 0 is the announcement date 
and days are measured in trading days relative to the announcement date. This variable is not 
scaled. See CARs for estimation details. Source: Datastream. 
Cash flow Cash flow ratio is calculated as the cash flow from operations over the total assets at the end of 
fiscal year before the takeover announcement. Source: SDC, Datastream, and Worldscope.  
Cash-only 
Transaction  
This dummy variable takes a value of one if the takeover is fully paid in cash, and is zero otherwise. 
Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
Challenged deal This dummy takes the value of one if the bidder’s takeover attempt was challenged by another 
bidder. Source: SDC. 
Days to 
completion 
The number of days between the announcement date of the takeover and the date of its successful 
completion. Source: SDC. 
Deal value Deal value is measured as the natural logarithm of the transaction value disclosed in SDC in 
millions of US dollars. Source: SDC. 
Diversification This dummy variable takes a value of one if the target and the acquirer operate in different 
industries (the primary 2-digit SIC codes are different), and is zero otherwise. Source: Thomson 
Financial, LexisNexis, Financial Times, and Worldscope. 
Distressed  This dummy variable equals one if net income of the target firm is zero or negative in the year 
preceding the announcement of the deal, and is zero otherwise. Source: SDC, Datastream, and 
Worldscope. 
Hostile Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the target management reacts negatively 
to the initial takeover offer but the bidder persists with the takeover. Source: Thomson Financial, 
LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
Leverage Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total assets in the 
fiscal year prior to the takeover announcement. Source: SDC, Datastream, and Worldscope.  
Successful 
takeover 
This dummy variable takes a value of one if the deal was completed successfully at the end of the 
sample period at 31 December 2010. It is taken directly from SDC Platinum data; for 28 
transactions with missing information about completion, we identify their outcome through 
internet and news database search. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Financial Times. 
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Takeover Law 
Index 
The takeover law index measures the quality of takeover law in a given country. It is the sum of 
six components as defined in Table 2: (1) ownership disclosure, (2) mandatory bid, (3) fair price 
for the minority shareholders, (4) squeeze-out rights, (5) sell-out rights, and (6) management 
neutrality, where the squeeze-out rule is negatively coded. The index ranges from minus one to 
five. A higher value indicates a stricter takeover law, that is, a takeover law more favorable to 
target shareholders. Source: Countries' Takeover Law and Regulation, Companies Law, Securities 
Laws, and Stock Exchange Regulation; own construction. 
Takeover Premium The takeover premium is calculated as the ratio of the price paid per share to the target’s closing 
stock price one day prior to the original announcement date, minus one, expressed as a percentage: 
(offer price / share price at t–1 – 1) × 100. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, Financial 
Times, and Datastream. 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of the total assets divided by the book value of the total 
assets, where the market value of the total assets is equal to the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total debt. The market value of equity is the value two months prior to the takeover 
announcement, book value of total assets and total debt are the values at the fiscal year end prior 
to the takeover announcement. Source: SDC, Datastream, and Worldscope. 
Toehold Toehold is the percentage of the target shares that the bidder owns in the target firms prior to the 
takeover announcement. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
 
Appendix B: Sources of the Takeover Law Index for European Countries, 1986–
2010 
Country  Sources 
Austria   Companies Act 1965; Stock Exchange Act of 1989; Takeover Law 1998; Stock Exchange Act of 1989 
as amended on June 26, 2006; Takeover Law 2006. Current regulator: Vienna Stock Exchange, 
Austrian Financial Market Authority, Takeover Commission. 
Belgium   The Law of 2 March 1989; Takeover Decree 1989; Companies Act 1995; Takeover Act 2007; 
Takeover Decree 2007; Transparency Law 2007. Current regulator: The Belgian Banking, Finance 
and Insurance Commission (CBFA). 
Czech Republic  Civil Code 1963; Commercial Code 1991; Commercial Code 1996; Commercial Code 2000; Capital 
Market Act 2004; Takeover Law 2008. Current regulator: The Czech National Bank (CNB). 
Denmark   Companies Act 1985; Code of Ethics 1987; Securities Trading Act 1995; Securities Trading Act 1999; 
Order on Takeover Bids 2005; Takeover Act 2006; Companies Act 2006; Securities Trading Act 2008; 
Companies Act 2009. Current regulator: the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). 
Finland   Companies Act 1978; Securities Market Act 1989; Securities Market Act 1993; Companies Act 1997; 
Securities Market Act 1999; Securities Market Act 2006; Companies Act 2006. Current regulator: 
Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FSA). 
France   Act on Commercial Companies 1966; SEC Decision 1981, Act related to Stock Companies Interests 
1985; Act on Commercial Companies 1985; Act on Savings 1987; Financial Market Act 1989; Stock 
Exchange Order on Takeover Bids 1992; Act on Commercial Companies 2000; Commercial Code 
2000; Takeover Act 2006; Order of AMF 2006. Current regulator: Authority of Financial markets 
(AMF). 
Germany   Companies Act 1965; Securities Trading Act 1994; Takeover Code 1995; Takeover Act 2001; 
Takeover Offer Regulation 2001; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency Directive Implementation Act 
2007. Current Regulator: Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). 
47 
 
Greece   Companies Act 1920; Decree on Information Disclosure 1992; Stock Exchange Decision 2000; 
Takeover Decision 2002; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency Law 2007. Current Regulator: The 
Hellenic Capital Markets Commission (CMC). 
Ireland Companies Act 1963; the UK takeover law index for the period 1986-1996; Companies Act 1990; 
Takeover Act 1997; Takeover Regulations 2006; Transparency Regulation 2007; Takeover Rules 
2007; Transparency Rules 2009. Current regulator: The Irish Takeover Panel. 
Italy   Securities Market Law 1974; Public Offer Regulation 1992; Financial Act 1998; Amendment of 
Consolidated Financial Act 2007. Current regulator: National Commission for Companies and Stock 
Exchange (CONSOB). 
Luxembourg Companies Act 1915; Companies Act 1987; Law on Information Disclosure in a Listed Company 
1992; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency law 2008. Current regulator: Luxembourg Financial Services 
Authority (CSSF). 
Netherlands   Civil Code Book 2 1958; Amendment of regulating the transfer of shares in Civil Code Book 2 1988-
1989; Introducing buy-out minority interests in Civil Code Book 2 1984-1985; Disclosure Act 1992; 
Disclosure Act 1996; Disclosure Act 2006; Financial Supervision Act 2006; Takeover Act 2007. 
Current regulator: The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). 
Portugal Commercial Code 1986; Securities Market Code 1991; Securities Market Code 1995; Securities 
Market Code 1999; Securities Market Code 2006. Current regulator: Portuguese Securities Market 
Commission (CMVM). 
Spain   Takeover Decree 1980; Securities Market Act 1988; Act on Public Bid 1991; Securities Market Act 
2007; Takeover Decree 2007, Transparency Act 2007. Current regulator: National Securities Market
Commission (CNMV). 
Sweden   NBK Recommendations 1971; Act on Acquisitions 1982; Securities Market Act 1985; Securities 
Council Statement 1986; Financial Instruments Trading Act 1991; NBK Recommendations 1994; 
NBK Recommendations 1999, NBK Rules 2003; Companies Act 2005; Takeover Rules 2006; 
Takeover Act 2006. Current regulator: The Swedish Industry and Commerce Stock Exchange 
Committee (NBK), the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). 
United 
Kingdom   
Companies Act 1985; Takeover Code 1985; Companies Act 1989; Takeover Code 2006, Companies 
Act 2006. Current regulator: The UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the Takeover Panel). 
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Appendix C 
Correlation matrix  
The coefficients shown are Pearson correlation coefficients for pairwise complete observations. Some coefficients have been omitted for brevity. The full table is 
available from the authors. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
Combined  
CAR 
Bidder  
CAR 
Target  
CAR 
Takeover  
premium 
Days to  
completion 
Takeover 
index 
Ownership  
disclosure 
Mandatory  
bid 
Fair price  
for minority 
Squeeze- 
out right 
Sellout  
rights 
Manage- 
ment  
neutrality 
Combined CAR -  0.80 *** 0.37*** 0.15*** 0.00 0.00  -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Bidder CAR 0.80*** -  0.10*** 0.01  0.03 -0.06** -0.08*** -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  -0.10 *** 
Target CAR 0.37*** 0.10 *** -  0.51*** -0.02  0.07** 0.09*** 0.03  0.04  0.06** 0.04  0.11 *** 
Takeover premium 0.15*** 0.01  0.51*** -  -0.08*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.09 *** 0.07** 0.09*** 0.16 *** 
Days to completion 0.00  0.03  -0.02  -0.08*** - -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.11 *** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.02  
Challenged deal 0.03  -0.03  0.04  0.22*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07** 0.09 *** 0.04  0.04  0.08 *** 
Deal value (log) 0.09*** -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02 -0.09*** -0.05* -0.11*** -0.06 ** -0.06** -0.09*** -0.04  
Toehold -0.03  0.05 * -0.11*** -0.07** 0.05 -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.07 ** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.08 *** 
Hostile bid 0.05* -0.07 ** 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.01 0.09*** 0.07** 0.06** 0.04  0.06** 0.08*** 0.12 *** 
Cash-only transaction 0.03  0.11 *** 0.05* 0.01  -0.02 -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.05 * -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.17 *** 
Cross-border transaction 0.01  0.05 * 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.11 *** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.16 *** 
Diversification -0.06** -0.02  0.02  -0.03  -0.01 0.05* 0.06** 0.05* 0.04  0.08*** 0.07** 0.06 ** 
(T) CAR run-up -0.03  0.00  0.01  0.17*** 0.00 0.07** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.06 ** 0.04  0.04  0.07 ** 
(T) Age 0.07** 0.01  0.05* 0.02  0.03 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.06 ** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.13 *** 
(T) Total assets 0.12*** 0.06 * -0.04  -0.04  0.07*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.11 *** -0.10*** -0.16*** -0.11 *** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.10*** -0.09 *** -0.08*** -0.09*** 0.03 -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.06 ** -0.33*** -0.28*** -0.06 ** 
(T) Leverage 0.05* 0.07 *** -0.05* -0.01  0.01 -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  0.00  -0.05* -0.05* -0.04  
(T) Cash flow 0.12*** 0.05 * 0.05* 0.02  0.01 0.04  0.05* 0.01  0.01  0.05* 0.04  0.07 ** 
(T) Distressed -0.11*** -0.06 ** -0.03  0.01  0.03 0.03  0.05* 0.06** 0.01  0.05  0.04  -0.01  
(A) Age 0.03  0.06 ** 0.06** 0.05* -0.02 0.07** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.05 * 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.07 ** 
(A) Total assets -0.03  0.09 *** 0.05* 0.02  0.05 -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.10 *** -0.07** -0.12*** -0.17 *** 
(A) Cash flow 0.09*** 0.08 *** 0.14*** 0.06* -0.01 0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Summary of empirical predictions on the effect of stricter takeover law and key provisions 
 Predicted effect on 
announcement returns 
 
 Combined Bidder Target Main rationale 
Takeover law 
index 
- - + Increases the protection of target shareholders in the event of a 
takeover attempt. Targets gain at the expense of bidders, 
while increasing regulation and managerial entrenchment 
reduce the overall efficiency of takeovers. 
Ownership 
disclosure 
- - + Limits the initial stake of a bidder in a target firm, which is the 
primary source of profits for bidders. It may entrench target 
managers, reducing the overall efficiency of the takeover. It 
also increases the transparency of a takeover bid and may 
increase the likelihood of competing bids, profiting target 
shareholders.  
Mandatory bid - - + Protects the minority shareholders by providing them with an 
opportunity to exit the company in the event of a change of 
control. However, it increases the cost of takeovers and may 
also entrench target managers, reducing the overall efficiency 
of the takeover. 
Fair price for 
minority 
- - + Benefits minority shareholders by guaranteeing a fair price 
relative to the market value of the target’s shares in a 
takeover bid. Bidders are less likely to exploit target 
shareholders, but this rule might increase financing costs and 
make takeovers more expensive when bidders attempt a 
takeover bid, which may reduce the overall takeover 
efficiency. 
Squeeze-out right + + - Can be used to control the free-rider problem in takeovers, 
thereby making value-increasing takeovers feasible. Because 
acquirers can squeeze out the minority shareholders in the 
target firm, acquirers may benefit at the expense of target 
shareholders. 
Sell-out rights - - + Pressure to tender the shares is reduced for minority 
shareholders, as they can sell their shares later, but this may 
come at a price for bidders. It increases the cost of takeovers 
and may reduce the efficiency of takeover regulation. 
Management 
neutrality 
+ + + Addresses potential agency problems between the target’s 
shareholders and management. This reduces management 
defenses in a bid, makes it less costly for bidders to reach an 
agreement with target shareholders, and thus increases 
takeover efficiency. 
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Table 2 
Coding of takeover law provisions 
This table defines the coding of the components of the takeover law index. 
Variable Definition 
Ownership disclosure Following Armour et al. (2007), it equals 1 if the shareholders who acquire at least 3% of 
the company's capital have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5% of the capital; 
equals 0.5 if this concerns 10%; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25%; otherwise zero. 
Mandatory bid Following Armour et al. (2007), it equals 1 if there is a mandatory public bid for the 
entirety of shares in case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0.5 if a 
mandatory bid is triggered at a higher percentage (such as 40% or 50%); equals 0.5 if 
there is a mandatory bid rule but no specific percentage required; further, it equals 0.5 
if there is a mandatory bid rule, but the bidder is only required to buy part of the shares,
and equals zero if there is no mandatory bid rule at all. 
Fair price for the 
minority shareholders 
Equals 1 if the mandatory offer is restricted by law to offer some measures of a market 
price (usually an average price paid for the same securities over a period of six to 
twelve months prior to the offer) and zero otherwise. 
Squeeze-out rights Equals negative 1 if the majority shareholders can squeeze the minority shareholders out 
at a certain level of ownership (usually 90% or more) and zero otherwise. 
Sell-out rights Equals 1 if the minority shareholders can require the majority owner to buy them out at a 
certain level of ownership (usually 90% or more) and zero otherwise. We code the sell-
out rights rule with a value of one and zero because all sample countries employing a 
sell-out rule use 90% or more as the threshold to trigger the sell-out rights rule. Among 
those countries, only Germany, France, Netherland, Belgium, Czech Republic use 95% 
as the threshold while the other countries use 90% as the threshold. A similar reasoning 
applies to the coding of the squeeze-out rights rule.  
Management neutrality Equals 1 if there is a strict obligation for the target management to maintain neutrality in 
a bid, 0.5 if there is a management neutrality rule but subject to the reciprocity rule and 
zero otherwise. 
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Table 3 
Takeover law index for European countries, 1986–2010 
This table reports the takeover law index for our sample countries in the period 1986–2010. The takeover law index measures the quality of takeover law in a given 
country. It takes the value of the accumulation of six variables, as defined in Table 2: (1) ownership disclosure, (2) mandatory bid, (3) fair price for the minority 
shareholders, (4) squeeze-out rights (negatively coded); (5) sell-out rights; and (6) management neutrality. Theoretically possible index values are in the range [–
1, 5]. A higher value indicates a takeover law more favorable for target shareholders. Source: Country's Takeover Law and Regulation, Companies Law, Securities 
Laws, and Stock Exchange Regulation; own construction. 
Year AUT BEL CZE DNK ESP FIN FRA DEU GBR GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE
1986 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.25 5.75 0 5.75 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1987 0 0 0 2 0 0 0.75 0.25 5.75 0 5.75 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1988 0 0 0 2 1.25 0 0.75 0.25 5.75 0 5.75 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1989 0.5 3.25 0 2 1.25 2 2.25 0.25 6 0 6 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1990 0.5 3.25 0 2 1.25 2 2.25 0.25 6 0 6 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1991 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 2.25 0.25 6 0 6 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1992 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 4.75 0.25 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 0.5 1.5
1993 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 4.75 0.25 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 0.5 1.5
1994 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 0.5 1.75
1995 0.5 3.25 0 2.25 3.25 2 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1996 0.5 3.25 1 2.25 3.25 2 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1997 0.5 3.25 1 2.25 3.25 4 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 4.75 3.5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1998 3.25 3.25 1 2.25 3.25 4 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1999 3.25 3.25 1 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2000 3.25 3.25 1 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2001 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2002 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2003 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.75
2004 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.75
2005 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 5.75
2006 4.75 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.75 5.25 5.25 6 5.5 4.75 5 5.5 3.75 6 5.75
2007 4.75 4.75 4.25 3.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 5.75 5.5 5.5 4.75 6 5.75
2008 4.75 4.75 5.75 3.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 5.75 5.5 5.75 4.75 6 5.75
2009 4.75 4.75 5.75 5.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 6 5.5 5.75 4.75 6 5.75
2010 4.75 4.75 5.75 5.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 6 5.5 5.75 4.75 6 5.75
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Table 4  
Summary statistics 
Panel A. Dependent variables and main control variables 
This panel reports descriptive statistics for attempted takeovers involving public bidders and public targets 
in European countries during 1986–2010. Firm accounting figures are based on the fiscal year data before 
the takeover announcement. For dummy variables, only the proportion of deals with the relevant attribute 
is reported in the “mean” column. Significance levels for tests whether announcement returns and 
takeover premiums are zero: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Dependent variables 
Combined CAR [–2, 2] (%) 1240 2.351*** 1.657 7.486 -18.675 26.139
Bidder CAR [–2, 2] (%) 1241 -0.563*** -0.524 7.490 -23.759 21.560
Target CAR [–2, 2] (%) 1273 17.295*** 12.462 20.913 -25.491 95.779
Takeover premium (%) 1027 30.599*** 26.450 34.725 -61.981 157.754
Successful takeover 1267 0.830  
Days to completion 1204 92.761 63.000 108.379 1.000 1427.000
Challenged deal 1273 0.124  
Takeover law variables 
Takeover index 1273 3.308 4.000 1.124 –1.000 4.000
Ownership disclosure 1273 0.884 1.000 0.155 0.000 1.000
Mandatory bid 1273 0.854 1.000 0.317 0.000 1.000
Fair price for minority 1273 0.897  
Squeeze-out right 1273 0.846  
Sell-out rights 1273 0.778  
Management neutrality 1273 0.741 1.000 0.421 0.000 1.000
Deal characteristics 
Deal value ($m) 1273 1092.629 161.609 2741.729 1.938 15974.420
Toehold (%) 1273 5.409 0.000 12.044 0.000 50.000
Hostile bid 1273 0.104  
Cash-only transaction 1273 0.391  
Cross-border transaction 1273 0.390  
Diversification 1273 0.443  
Target (T) and bidder (A) characteristics 
(T) CAR run-up 1273 0.089 0.053 0.258 -1.169 2.171
(T) Age 1273 13.224 9.465 10.923 0.287 45.881
(T) Total assets ($m) 1273 1755.096 168.550 7594.475 1.793 176293.111
(T) Tobin's Q 1273 2.006 0.793 4.352 0.162 31.070
(T) Leverage 1273 0.204 0.176 0.171 0.000 0.759
(T) Cash flow 1273 0.094 0.107 0.145 -0.692 0.452
(T) Distressed 1273 0.240  
(A) Age 1273 15.447 13.051 11.100 0.096 45.580
(A) Total assets ($m) 1273 8977.613 983.93633744.821 0.047 626933.000
(A) Cash flow 1273 0.116 0.118 0.106 -0.342 0.458
  (continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B. Year, country, and sector distribution 
This panel reports the number of transactions by year, country and SIC division. The sample consists of 
all attempted takeovers involving public bidders and public targets in European countries during 1986–
2010. The following abbreviations of country codes are used: AUT (Austria), BEL (Belgium), CZE 
(Czech Republic), DNK (Denmark), FIN (Finland), FRA (France), DEU (Germany), GRC (Greece), IRL 
(Republic of Ireland), ITA (Italy), LUX (Luxembourg), NLD (Netherlands), PRT (Portugal), ESP 
(Spain), SWE (Sweden), GBR (United Kingdom) for targets and bidders in EU countries and AU 
(Australia), CA (Canada), JP (Japan), NO (Norway), SZ (Switzerland), US (United States) for bidders in 
non-EU countries. 
Year  Nation  SIC division 
 Deals nxi  Targets Ij Bidders Iixj Targets ij Bidders 
N %   N % N % N %  N % 
1986 6 0.5  AUT 13 1.0  11 0.9  1 123 9.7 118 9.5 
1987 11 0.9  BEL 22 1.7  15 1.2  2 215 16.9 236 19.0 
1988 21 1.6  CZE 4 0.3  0 0  3 290 22.8 295 23.8 
1989 17 1.3  DEU 86 6.8  70 5.6  4 143 11.2 160 12.9 
1990 13 1.0  DNK 23 1.8  16 1.3  5 130 10.2 126 10.2 
1991 33 2.6  ESP 35 2.7  39 3.1  6 44 3.5 51 4.1 
1992 26 2.0  FIN 22 1.7  20 1.6  7 271 21.3 223 18.0 
1993 20 1.6  FRA 134 10.5  123 9.9  8 57 4.5 64 5.2 
1994 29 2.3  GBR 725 57.0  538 43.4     
1995 44 3.5  GRC 19 1.5  16 1.3        
1996 32 2.5  IRL 9 0.7  14 1.1        
1997 71 5.6  ITA 25 2.0  32 2.6        
1998 96 7.5  LUX 5 0.4  0 0        
1999 128 10.1  NLD 60 4.7  48 3.9        
2000 129 10.1  PRT 6 0.5  0 0        
2001 81 6.4  SWE 85 6.7  61 4.9        
2002 55 4.3  AU 0 0.0  9 0.7        
2003 59 4.6  CA 0 0.0  16 1.3        
2004 59 4.6  JP 0 0.0  8 0.6        
2005 76 6.0  NO 0 0.0  5 0.4        
2006 78 6.1  SZ 0 0.0  26 2.1        
2007 77 6.0  US 0 0.0  171 13.8        
2008 47 3.7  Other 0 0.0  35 2.8        
2009 36 2.8            
2010 29 2.3            
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Table 5  
Effect of takeover law on weighted total announcement returns 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of weighted announcement returns to target and bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a 
window of [-2, 2] trading days around the takeover announcement, weighted by target and bidder market capitalization two trading days before the announcement. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, 
respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 0.755 (0.44)*                   
Ownership disclosure    6.468 (2.70)** 5.436 (2.73)** 5.964 (2.90) ** 6.835 (2.93)** 6.851 (2.94)** 6.800 (2.93)** 
Mandatory bid       1.439 (1.22)  2.596 (2.15)  5.336 (2.54)** 5.615 (2.76)** 5.633 (2.77)** 
Fair price for minority          -1.310 (2.03)  -2.260 (2.06)  -2.256 (2.07)  -3.047 (2.14)  
Squeeze-out right             -2.566 (1.50)* -2.238 (1.80)  -2.875 (1.86)  
Sell-out rights                -0.594 (1.85)  0.050 (1.98)  
Management neutrality                   2.316 (2.07)  
Deal value -0.202 (0.29)  -0.202 (0.29)  -0.210 (0.30)  -0.220 (0.30)  -0.223 (0.29)  -0.225 (0.29)  -0.213 (0.29)  
Toehold -0.018 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.021 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.021 (0.02)  
Hostile bid 0.371 (0.68)  0.336 (0.68)  0.323 (0.68)  0.303 (0.68)  0.333 (0.68)  0.330 (0.68)  0.287 (0.68)  
Cash-only transaction 0.949 (0.51)* 0.910 (0.51)* 0.927 (0.52)* 0.934 (0.51) * 0.884 (0.51)* 0.876 (0.52)* 0.887 (0.52)* 
Cross-border transaction 0.575 (0.53)  0.659 (0.54)  0.654 (0.54)  0.677 (0.55)  0.710 (0.54)  0.714 (0.55)  0.707 (0.55)  
Diversification -0.827 (0.49)* -0.852 (0.49)* -0.858 (0.49)* -0.861 (0.49) * -0.865 (0.49)* -0.862 (0.49)* -0.862 (0.49)* 
(T) CAR run-up -0.972 (0.86)  -0.923 (0.86)  -0.961 (0.86)  -0.947 (0.87)  -0.960 (0.86)  -0.968 (0.86)  -0.952 (0.86)  
(T) Age -0.023 (0.02)  -0.022 (0.02)  -0.025 (0.02)  -0.025 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  
(T) Total assets 1.096 (0.31)*** 1.062 (0.31)*** 1.089 (0.31)*** 1.102 (0.31) *** 1.099 (0.30)*** 1.102 (0.30)*** 1.105 (0.31)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.216 (0.08)*** -0.219 (0.08)*** -0.217 (0.08)*** -0.215 (0.08) *** -0.224 (0.08)*** -0.224 (0.08)*** -0.218 (0.08)*** 
(T) Leverage 0.452 (1.32)  0.512 (1.32)  0.492 (1.31)  0.512 (1.32)  0.494 (1.32)  0.493 (1.32)  0.475 (1.32)  
(T) Cash flow 3.152 (2.06)  2.980 (2.04)  2.918 (2.05)  2.838 (2.05)  2.914 (2.04)  2.895 (2.04)  2.870 (2.04)  
(T) Distressed -1.277 (0.66)* -1.306 (0.66)** -1.315 (0.66)** -1.340 (0.66) ** -1.364 (0.66)** -1.372 (0.66)** -1.354 (0.66)** 
(A) Age 0.026 (0.02)  0.029 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  0.028 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  
(A) Total assets -0.775 (0.16)*** -0.772 (0.16)*** -0.771 (0.16)*** -0.773 (0.16) *** -0.769 (0.16)*** -0.770 (0.16)*** -0.777 (0.16)*** 
(A) Cash flow 4.763 (2.78)* 5.146 (2.77)* 5.037 (2.77)* 5.093 (2.77) * 5.161 (2.74)* 5.182 (2.74)* 5.302 (2.75)* 
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  
R² (adj.) 0.084  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.084  0.083  0.084  
F-statistic 2.591  2.595  2.581  2.550  2.560  2.525  2.507  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 6  
Effect of takeover law on weighted total announcement returns – excluding UK targets 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of weighted announcement returns to non-UK-target and bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns 
in a window of [-2, 2] trading days around the takeover announcement, weighted by target and bidder market capitalization two trading days before the announcement. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, 
respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 1.151 (0.55)**                   
Ownership disclosure    10.534 (4.40)** 10.229 (4.40)** 12.043 (4.65)*** 13.157 (4.67) *** 13.195 (4.69) *** 13.627 (4.70)*** 
Mandatory bid       2.548 (1.48)* 4.979 (2.53)** 8.135 (2.98) *** 8.065 (3.07) *** 8.537 (3.08)*** 
Fair price for minority          -2.578 (2.18)  -3.656 (2.23)  -3.675 (2.25)  -5.136 (2.49)** 
Squeeze-out right             -3.083 (1.54) ** -3.190 (1.90) * -4.178 (2.03)** 
Sell-out rights                0.199 (2.05)  1.413 (2.24)  
Management neutrality                   3.354 (2.47)  
Deal value -0.298 (0.40)  -0.366 (0.40)  -0.354 (0.40)  -0.389 (0.40)  -0.420 (0.40)  -0.419 (0.40)  -0.386 (0.40)  
Toehold -0.039 (0.02)  -0.043 (0.02)* -0.042 (0.02)* -0.044 (0.02)* -0.043 (0.02) * -0.043 (0.02) * -0.044 (0.02)* 
Hostile bid -0.997 (1.49)  -1.280 (1.49)  -1.117 (1.49)  -1.233 (1.49)  -1.181 (1.49)  -1.183 (1.49)  -1.470 (1.50)  
Cash-only transaction 0.918 (0.81)  0.905 (0.81)  0.787 (0.81)  0.771 (0.81)  0.671 (0.81)  0.675 (0.81)  0.637 (0.81)  
Cross-border transaction -0.401 (0.74)  -0.267 (0.74)  -0.237 (0.74)  -0.155 (0.74)  -0.091 (0.74)  -0.094 (0.74)  -0.119 (0.74)  
Diversification -2.115 (0.78)*** -2.115 (0.78)*** -2.093 (0.78)*** -2.066 (0.78)*** -2.094 (0.77) *** -2.093 (0.77) *** -2.042 (0.77)*** 
(T) CAR run-up -2.461 (1.46)* -2.180 (1.45)  -2.398 (1.45)* -2.364 (1.45)  -2.384 (1.45) * -2.380 (1.45)  -2.368 (1.45)  
(T) Age -0.085 (0.05)* -0.081 (0.05)* -0.088 (0.05)* -0.088 (0.05)* -0.097 (0.05) ** -0.096 (0.05) ** -0.095 (0.05)** 
(T) Total assets 1.193 (0.44)*** 1.226 (0.44)*** 1.220 (0.44)*** 1.269 (0.44)*** 1.293 (0.44) *** 1.292 (0.44) *** 1.291 (0.44)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.209 (0.07)*** -0.202 (0.07)*** -0.213 (0.07)*** -0.210 (0.07)*** -0.220 (0.07) *** -0.220 (0.07) *** -0.213 (0.07)*** 
(T) Leverage -0.709 (2.04)  -0.778 (2.04)  -0.717 (2.03)  -0.652 (2.03)  -0.693 (2.03)  -0.689 (2.03)  -0.663 (2.03)  
(T) Cash flow 1.930 (3.26)  1.453 (3.25)  1.436 (3.24)  1.022 (3.26)  1.128 (3.25)  1.139 (3.25)  1.101 (3.25)  
(T) Distressed -0.899 (1.01)  -0.870 (1.01)  -0.997 (1.01)  -1.115 (1.02)  -1.193 (1.01)  -1.191 (1.01)  -1.157 (1.01)  
(A) Age 0.058 (0.04)  0.071 (0.04)* 0.065 (0.04)  0.066 (0.04)* 0.064 (0.04)  0.064 (0.04)  0.062 (0.04)  
(A) Total assets -0.653 (0.25)*** -0.695 (0.25)*** -0.683 (0.25)*** -0.688 (0.25)*** -0.675 (0.25) *** -0.674 (0.25) *** -0.687 (0.25)*** 
(A) Cash flow 2.675 (3.88)  3.442 (3.86)  3.270 (3.86)  3.615 (3.87)  3.824 (3.85)  3.798 (3.87)  4.300 (3.88)  
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 533  533  533  533  533  533  533  
R² (adj.) 0.083  0.087  0.091  0.092  0.097  0.095  0.097  
F-statistic 1.695  1.745  1.770  1.766  1.809  1.780  1.784  
P-value 0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 7 
Effect of takeover law on bidder announcement returns 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of announcement returns to bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of [-2, 
2] trading days around the takeover announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 0.343 (0.44)                     
Ownership disclosure    2.790 (2.91)   1.996 (2.92)   2.253 (3.06)   2.736 (3.13)   2.763 (3.13)   2.814 (3.14)   
Mandatory bid       1.104 (1.22)   1.694 (2.18)   3.290 (2.63)   3.921 (2.90)   3.917 (2.90)   
Fair price for minority          -0.669 (2.05)   -1.209 (2.11)   -1.195 (2.12)   -0.593 (2.19)   
Squeeze-out right             -1.512 (1.48)   -0.759 (2.02)   -0.271 (2.12)   
Sell-out rights                -1.356 (2.22)   -1.853 (2.33)   
Management neutrality                   -1.783 (2.03)   
Deal value -0.915 (0.28) *** -0.923 (0.28) *** -0.929 (0.28) *** -0.933 (0.28) *** -0.934 (0.28) *** -0.938 (0.28) *** -0.947 (0.28) *** 
Toehold 0.003 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   
Hostile bid -1.533 (0.66) ** -1.555 (0.67) ** -1.565 (0.67) ** -1.576 (0.67) ** -1.558 (0.67) ** -1.564 (0.67) ** -1.531 (0.67) ** 
Cash-only transaction 0.563 (0.51)   0.555 (0.51)   0.568 (0.51)   0.573 (0.51)   0.544 (0.51)   0.528 (0.51)   0.519 (0.51)   
Cross-border transaction 0.509 (0.54)   0.547 (0.55)   0.543 (0.55)   0.555 (0.55)   0.576 (0.55)   0.584 (0.56)   0.589 (0.56)   
Diversification -0.418 (0.49)   -0.418 (0.49)   -0.423 (0.49)   -0.424 (0.49)   -0.424 (0.49)   -0.418 (0.49)   -0.419 (0.49)   
(T) CAR run-up -0.149 (0.86)   -0.129 (0.85)   -0.159 (0.86)   -0.153 (0.86)   -0.162 (0.86)   -0.181 (0.86)   -0.193 (0.86)   
(T) Age -0.017 (0.02)   -0.016 (0.02)   -0.018 (0.02)   -0.018 (0.02)   -0.019 (0.02)   -0.019 (0.02)   -0.019 (0.02)   
(T) Total assets 0.691 (0.29) ** 0.688 (0.29) ** 0.708 (0.29) ** 0.715 (0.29) ** 0.712 (0.29) ** 0.721 (0.29) ** 0.719 (0.29) ** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.166 (0.09) * -0.167 (0.09) * -0.166 (0.09) * -0.164 (0.09) * -0.170 (0.09) ** -0.170 (0.09) ** -0.174 (0.09) ** 
(T) Leverage 1.266 (1.32)   1.287 (1.32)   1.271 (1.32)   1.281 (1.32)   1.269 (1.32)   1.267 (1.32)   1.282 (1.32)   
(T) Cash flow 2.110 (2.02)   2.088 (2.02)   2.040 (2.01)   1.997 (2.01)   2.038 (2.01)   1.995 (2.01)   2.016 (2.01)   
(T) Distressed -1.040 (0.61) * -1.054 (0.61) * -1.061 (0.61) * -1.074 (0.61) * -1.088 (0.61) * -1.108 (0.61) * -1.122 (0.61) * 
(A) Age 0.028 (0.02)   0.030 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   0.028 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   
(A) Total assets 0.178 (0.15)   0.174 (0.15)   0.175 (0.15)   0.174 (0.15)   0.176 (0.15)   0.174 (0.15)   0.179 (0.15)   
(A) Cash flow 5.872 (2.87) ** 5.941 (2.87) ** 5.857 (2.87) ** 5.885 (2.87) ** 5.922 (2.85) ** 5.970 (2.85) ** 5.879 (2.86) ** 
Target country effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry & year effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 1241   1241   1241   1241   1241   1241   1241   
R² (adj.) 0.060   0.060   0.060   0.059   0.059   0.059   0.059   
F-statistic 2.133   2.133   2.116   2.086   2.072   2.050   2.030   
P-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
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Table 8  
Effect of takeover law on target announcement returns  
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of announcement returns to target shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of [-2,2] trading 
days around the takeover announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 4.135 (1.11)***                   
Ownership disclosure    22.461 (8.86)** 17.132 (9.14)* 14.805 (9.53)  17.242 (9.57) * 17.260 (9.56) * 17.075 (9.55) * 
Mandatory bid       7.369 (3.09)** 2.222 (5.63)  10.176 (7.92)  10.391 (7.76)  10.421 (7.77)  
Fair price for minority          5.840 (5.37)  3.202 (5.77)  3.213 (5.83)  0.583 (6.41)  
Squeeze-out right             -7.587 (4.26) * -7.316 (5.57)  -9.465 (5.90)  
Sell-out rights                -0.483 (5.35)  1.699 (5.84)  
Management neutrality                   7.854 (5.78)  
Deal value 0.818 (0.77)  0.759 (0.77)  0.729 (0.78)  0.758 (0.78)  0.767 (0.78)  0.765 (0.78)  0.811 (0.78)  
Toehold -0.139 (0.05)*** -0.150 (0.05)*** -0.147 (0.05)*** -0.145 (0.05)*** -0.143 (0.05) *** -0.143 (0.05) *** -0.144 (0.05) *** 
Hostile bid 6.437 (1.74)*** 6.372 (1.76)*** 6.289 (1.75)*** 6.364 (1.75)*** 6.452 (1.75) *** 6.451 (1.75) *** 6.313 (1.76) *** 
Cash-only transaction 1.930 (1.36)  1.807 (1.36)  1.909 (1.36)  1.869 (1.36)  1.733 (1.37)  1.728 (1.37)  1.772 (1.37)  
Cross-border transaction 3.073 (1.40)** 3.339 (1.41)** 3.326 (1.41)** 3.233 (1.42)** 3.324 (1.42) ** 3.326 (1.42) ** 3.307 (1.42) ** 
Diversification 0.101 (1.27)  0.120 (1.27)  0.100 (1.27)  0.091 (1.27)  0.103 (1.27)  0.105 (1.27)  0.117 (1.27)  
(T) CAR run-up -3.426 (3.05)  -3.161 (3.06)  -3.372 (3.07)  -3.443 (3.08)  -3.494 (3.06)  -3.500 (3.08)  -3.439 (3.08)  
(T) Age -0.002 (0.06)  0.008 (0.06)  -0.003 (0.06)  -0.002 (0.06)  -0.006 (0.06)  -0.006 (0.06)  -0.006 (0.06)  
(T) Total assets -2.185 (0.83)*** -2.260 (0.83)*** -2.132 (0.83)** -2.181 (0.83)*** -2.202 (0.83) *** -2.200 (0.83) *** -2.188 (0.83) *** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.883 (0.17)*** -0.888 (0.17)*** -0.881 (0.17)*** -0.891 (0.17)*** -0.920 (0.17) *** -0.919 (0.17) *** -0.901 (0.17) *** 
(T) Leverage -4.134 (3.70)  -3.890 (3.73)  -3.994 (3.71)  -4.112 (3.72)  -4.184 (3.72)  -4.185 (3.72)  -4.209 (3.72)  
(T) Cash flow 0.598 (6.53)  0.429 (6.53)  0.126 (6.54)  0.548 (6.54)  0.714 (6.53)  0.702 (6.54)  0.529 (6.53)  
(T) Distressed -0.766 (1.78)  -0.939 (1.79)  -0.975 (1.79)  -0.846 (1.79)  -0.935 (1.79)  -0.942 (1.80)  -0.873 (1.80)  
(A) Age -0.017 (0.06)  -0.001 (0.06)  -0.009 (0.06)  -0.010 (0.06)  -0.012 (0.06)  -0.012 (0.06)  -0.014 (0.06)  
(A) Total assets 1.428 (0.46)*** 1.409 (0.46)*** 1.409 (0.46)*** 1.423 (0.46)*** 1.434 (0.46) *** 1.434 (0.46) *** 1.405 (0.46) *** 
(A) Cash flow 18.474 (6.54)*** 19.321 (6.54)*** 18.715 (6.54)*** 18.490 (6.55)*** 18.527 (6.51) *** 18.540 (6.53) *** 18.985 (6.54) *** 
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  
R² (adj.) 0.143  0.138  0.141  0.141  0.143  0.142  0.143  
F-statistic 4.031  3.899  3.939  3.902  3.908  3.852  3.828  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 9 
Effect of takeover law on takeover premiums 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of takeovers premiums involving public bidders and public targets in European countries in the period 1986–2010. 
Takeover premiums are defined as offered share price divided by pre-announcement share price one day prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 7.654 (2.31) ***                   
Ownership disclosure    18.076 (24.17)   -3.732 (24.70)   -3.191 (24.86)   1.834 (25.12)   2.719 (25.09)   3.382 (25.11)   
Mandatory bid       24.107 (6.40) *** 25.947 (11.39) ** 37.315 (14.06) *** 46.952 (15.03) *** 47.930 (15.09) *** 
Fair price for minority          -2.109 (10.80)   -6.887 (11.34)   -6.343 (11.33)   -10.064 (12.28)   
Squeeze-out right             -11.132 (8.09)   -1.388 (9.73)   -4.459 (10.49)   
Sell-out rights                -17.938 (9.97) * -15.471 (10.46)   
Management neutrality                   9.513 (12.13)   
Deal value 6.337 (1.42) *** 6.325 (1.43) *** 6.256 (1.42) *** 6.249 (1.42) *** 6.160 (1.42) *** 6.129 (1.42) *** 6.140 (1.42) *** 
Toehold -0.009 (0.10)   -0.037 (0.10)   -0.008 (0.10)   -0.009 (0.10)   -0.008 (0.10)   -0.013 (0.10)   -0.012 (0.10)   
Hostile bid 11.329 (3.62) *** 10.990 (3.64) *** 11.483 (3.62) *** 11.468 (3.62) *** 11.653 (3.62) *** 11.728 (3.62) *** 11.636 (3.62) *** 
Cash-only transaction 2.679 (2.55)   2.839 (2.57)   2.771 (2.55)   2.801 (2.56)   2.579 (2.56)   2.436 (2.56)   2.481 (2.56)   
Cross-border transaction 5.059 (2.47) ** 5.061 (2.48) ** 5.194 (2.47) ** 5.210 (2.47) ** 5.375 (2.47) ** 5.353 (2.47) ** 5.240 (2.47) ** 
Diversification -4.547 (2.30) ** -4.504 (2.31) * -4.408 (2.29) * -4.394 (2.30) * -4.474 (2.29) * -4.385 (2.29) * -4.368 (2.29) * 
(T) CAR run-up 16.846 (4.26) *** 16.821 (4.28) *** 16.802 (4.25) *** 16.830 (4.26) *** 16.836 (4.26) *** 16.337 (4.26) *** 16.416 (4.26) *** 
(T) Age -0.072 (0.11)   -0.049 (0.11)   -0.084 (0.11)   -0.084 (0.11)   -0.089 (0.11)   -0.097 (0.11)   -0.098 (0.11)   
(T) Total assets -7.190 (1.50) *** -7.368 (1.51) *** -7.007 (1.50) *** -6.991 (1.50) *** -6.994 (1.50) *** -6.891 (1.50) *** -6.838 (1.50) *** 
(T) Tobin's Q -1.988 (0.37) *** -1.987 (0.37) *** -1.995 (0.37) *** -1.993 (0.37) *** -2.000 (0.37) *** -2.018 (0.37) *** -1.998 (0.37) *** 
(T) Leverage 2.889 (6.86)   3.709 (6.90)   3.138 (6.85)   3.168 (6.86)   3.190 (6.85)   3.515 (6.85)   3.357 (6.85)   
(T) Cash flow -3.984 (8.78)   -3.953 (8.84)   -4.787 (8.78)   -4.893 (8.80)   -4.362 (8.81)   -4.764 (8.80)   -4.889 (8.80)   
(T) Distressed 2.033 (2.97)   1.862 (2.99)   1.626 (2.97)   1.596 (2.97)   1.496 (2.97)   1.143 (2.98)   1.245 (2.98)   
(A) Age 0.001 (0.11)   0.027 (0.11)   -0.008 (0.11)   -0.008 (0.11)   -0.007 (0.11)   -0.012 (0.11)   -0.015 (0.11)   
(A) Total assets 0.846 (0.75)   0.839 (0.76)   0.817 (0.75)   0.813 (0.75)   0.875 (0.76)   0.829 (0.75)   0.809 (0.76)   
(A) Cash flow 3.785 (10.49)   4.898 (10.55)   3.746 (10.48)   3.818 (10.49)   3.792 (10.49)   4.587 (10.48)   5.016 (10.50)   
Target country effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry & year effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 1027   1027   1027   1027   1027   1027   1027   
R² (adj.) 0.148   0.139   0.151   0.150   0.151   0.153   0.152   
F-statistic 3.549   3.364   3.562   3.510   3.491   3.495   3.456   
P-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
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Table 10  
Mediation tests for takeover premium 
This table reports results for Sobel mediation tests on takeover premiums and the takeover law index. The 
hypothesis tested is whether takeover premiums (as measured by the offer price divided by the share price 
one day prior to the announcement) mediate the effect of takeover law on target announcement returns, 
bidder announcement returns or combined target-bidder announcement returns. All models include the 
full set of covariates shown in Table 8 for targets, bidders and the combined company, respectively. To 
conserve space, only coefficients for the variables of interest are reported here. The number of 
observations in this table is less than the observations in the related tables due to the additional 
requirement of having complete observations for takeover premiums. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Combined CAR x Target CAR x Bidder CAR 
 
Model regressing dependent variable (in column header) on takeover index 
Takeover index (direct path) 1.183 (0.526)**  3.628 (1.377)***  1.020 (0.530)* 
            
Model regressing mediator on takeover law 
Takeover index (path a) 8.138 (2.328)***  7.658 (2.309)***  8.138 (2.328)*** 
            
Model regressing dependent variable on mediator and takeover law 
Takeover premium (path b) 0.035 (0.007)***  0.289 (0.017)***  0.002 (0.007)
Takeover index (direct path) 0.896 (0.524)*  1.411 (1.211)  1.002 (0.533)* 
            
Sobel mediation tests (using the coefficients above) 
Path a coefficient 8.138 (2.328)***  7.658 (2.309)***  8.138 (2.328)*** 
Path b coefficient 0.035 (0.007)***  0.289 (0.017)***  0.002 (0.007)
Indirect effect (Sobel test; a∙b) 0.287 (0.101)***  2.217 (0.681)***  0.018 (0.061)
Direct effect of takeover index 0.896 (0.524)*  1.411 (1.211)  1.002 (0.533)* 
Total effect of takeover index 1.183 (0.526)**  3.628 (1.377)***  1.020 (0.530)* 
            
Model statistics for model explaining CAR with mediator and takeover law index (path b & direct path) 
Observations 1002   1027   1002  
F-test 2.660   8.490   1.840  
F-test p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000  
R² (adj.) 0.107   0.344   0.057  
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Table 11 
Deals more likely to be challenged under stricter ownership disclosure and fair price rule 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the proposed transaction is challenged by a rival bidder and zero otherwise. We use data from Thomson 
Financial (SDC Platinum) for this variable. The table reports coefficients of Probit regressions of this indicator variable on the takeover law index and takeover law 
provisions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    
Takeover index 0.337 (0.13)***                   
Ownership disclosure    3.399 (1.32)** 3.046 (1.45)** 3.117 (1.72)* 3.506 (1.81)* 3.523 (1.86)* 3.582 (1.74)** 
Mandatory bid       0.434 (0.34)  -0.792 (0.67)  -0.292 (0.87)  0.013 (0.99)  0.009 (0.95)  
Fair price for minority          1.569 (0.67)** 1.281 (0.68)* 1.336 (0.67)** 1.106 (0.64)* 
Squeeze-out right             -0.475 (0.57)  -0.242 (0.60)  -0.487 (0.59)  
Sell-out rights                -0.505 (0.61)  -0.308 (0.65)  
Management neutrality                   1.064 (0.73)  
Deal value 0.211 (0.07)*** 0.216 (0.07)*** 0.211 (0.07)*** 0.220 (0.07)*** 0.224 (0.07)*** 0.223 (0.07)*** 0.231 (0.07)*** 
Toehold -0.013 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** -0.014 (0.01)** -0.014 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** 
Hostile bid 0.726 (0.18)*** 0.707 (0.18)*** 0.712 (0.18)*** 0.723 (0.18)*** 0.726 (0.18)*** 0.726 (0.18)*** 0.715 (0.18)*** 
Cash-only transaction 0.100 (0.14)  0.097 (0.14)  0.099 (0.14)  0.088 (0.14)  0.081 (0.14)  0.075 (0.14)  0.095 (0.14)  
Cross-border transaction -0.037 (0.13)  -0.019 (0.13)  -0.016 (0.13)  -0.039 (0.13)  -0.035 (0.13)  -0.030 (0.13)  -0.040 (0.13)  
Diversification -0.207 (0.13)  -0.202 (0.13)  -0.207 (0.13)* -0.214 (0.13)* -0.213 (0.13)* -0.210 (0.13)* -0.211 (0.13)* 
(T) CAR run-up 0.975 (0.23)*** 0.982 (0.23)*** 0.979 (0.23)*** 0.982 (0.23)*** 0.974 (0.23)*** 0.972 (0.23)*** 0.968 (0.23)*** 
(T) Age 0.002 (0.01)  0.003 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  
(T) Total assets -0.078 (0.08)  -0.086 (0.08)  -0.080 (0.08)  -0.090 (0.08)  -0.094 (0.08)  -0.091 (0.08)  -0.088 (0.08)  
(T) Tobin's Q -0.025 (0.02)  -0.025 (0.02)  -0.023 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  -0.029 (0.02)  -0.028 (0.02)  -0.030 (0.02)  
(T) Leverage 0.011 (0.39)  0.047 (0.38)  0.041 (0.38)  0.041 (0.39)  0.048 (0.39)  0.052 (0.40)  0.030 (0.40)  
(T) Cash flow 0.626 (0.52)  0.557 (0.51)  0.554 (0.51)  0.651 (0.52)  0.680 (0.53)  0.649 (0.52)  0.656 (0.53)  
(T) Distressed -0.060 (0.16)  -0.058 (0.16)  -0.064 (0.16)  -0.049 (0.16)  -0.053 (0.16)  -0.061 (0.16)  -0.048 (0.16)  
(A) Age -0.002 (0.01)  0.000 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  
(A) Total assets 0.010 (0.04)  0.005 (0.04)  0.006 (0.04)  0.007 (0.04)  0.006 (0.04)  0.005 (0.04)  0.002 (0.04)  
(A) Cash flow 0.788 (0.57)  0.906 (0.57)  0.864 (0.57)  0.781 (0.56)  0.798 (0.56)  0.808 (0.56)  0.868 (0.56)  
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  
McFadden R² (adj.) 0.040  0.038  0.038  0.042  0.041  0.040  0.040  
AIC 918.926  920.284  920.641  916.874  917.649  918.701  918.347  
LR test P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 12 
Larger toehold under stricter ownership disclosure 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of the toehold (in percentage points) that the bidder owns in the 
target on the announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: 
***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 1    2    3    
Takeover index -0.294 (0.84)        
Ownership disclosure    12.391 (6.32)* 15.063 (6.70)** 
Mandatory bid       4.235 (4.53)  
Fair price for minority       -5.680 (3.85)  
Squeeze-out right       3.627 (3.79)  
Sell-out rights       -4.288 (3.76)  
Management neutrality       2.366 (5.12)  
Deal value -2.558 (0.49)*** -2.585 (0.48)*** -2.594 (0.48)*** 
Hostile bid 1.288 (1.17)  1.067 (1.16)  0.936 (1.17)  
Cash-only transaction 2.744 (0.80)*** 2.736 (0.80)*** 2.723 (0.80)*** 
Cross-border transaction -1.763 (0.81)** -1.563 (0.83)* -1.457 (0.83)* 
Diversification 1.431 (0.78)* 1.390 (0.78)* 1.419 (0.78)* 
(T) CAR run-up -0.883 (1.19)  -0.923 (1.17)  -0.846 (1.18)  
(T) Age 0.013 (0.03)  0.008 (0.03)  0.008 (0.03)  
(T) Total assets 2.342 (0.47)*** 2.361 (0.47)*** 2.409 (0.47)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q 0.112 (0.11)  0.108 (0.11)  0.128 (0.11)  
(T) Leverage -1.673 (2.31)  -1.757 (2.32)  -1.614 (2.34)  
(T) Cash flow 2.287 (3.20)  2.089 (3.19)  1.535 (3.19)  
(T) Distressed 0.105 (0.95)  0.104 (0.95)  -0.050 (0.96)  
(A) Age -0.056 (0.03)* -0.052 (0.03)  -0.050 (0.03)  
(A) Total assets 0.867 (0.25)*** 0.845 (0.25)*** 0.810 (0.26)*** 
(A) Cash flow -5.442 (3.25)* -5.469 (3.25)* -4.852 (3.28)  
Target country effects Yes  Yes   Yes   
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes   Yes   
Observations 1273  1273  1273  
R² (adj.) 0.124  0.127  0.129  
F-statistic 3.563  3.653  3.520  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 13  
Hazard rate models for successful deal completion 
This table shows coefficients for competing risks models (models 1-3) and a Cox proportional hazards model 
(model 4) for the time to successful completion of an attempted takeover. Time to completion is measured in days 
from the announcement day. In models 1-3, the competing event is the unsuccessful completion of the deal. The 
proportional hazards model (4) treats unsuccessful takeover attempts as censored at the withdrawal date. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. The sample excludes takeover announcements for which the announcement date and 
effective date are the same, as these observations are not “at risk”. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate 
significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Competing risks models 
Cox proportional  
hazards model 
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
Takeover index 0.134 (0.06)**    0.150 (0.05)*** 0.139 (0.07)** 
Ownership disclosure    -0.764 (0.67)        
Mandatory bid    0.756 (0.45)*       
Fair price for minority    -0.281 (0.33)        
Squeeze-out right    -0.438 (0.24)*       
Sellout rights    0.061 (0.26)        
Management neutrality    0.560 (0.28)**       
Deal value -0.117 (0.05)*** -0.121 (0.05)***    -0.114 (0.05)** 
Toehold 0.000 (0.00)  0.000 (0.00)     0.000 (0.00)  
Hostile bid -0.869 (0.14)*** -0.880 (0.14)***    -0.879 (0.15)*** 
Cash-only transaction 0.119 (0.09)  0.120 (0.09)     0.119 (0.08)  
Cross-border transaction -0.114 (0.08)  -0.119 (0.08)     -0.116 (0.08)  
Diversification 0.102 (0.08)  0.099 (0.08)     0.106 (0.08)  
(T) CAR run-up -0.055 (0.13)  -0.070 (0.13)     -0.053 (0.13)  
(T) Age 0.004 (0.00)  0.004 (0.00)     0.004 (0.00)  
(T) Total assets -0.164 (0.05)*** -0.161 (0.05)***    -0.173 (0.05)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.023 (0.01)  -0.022 (0.02)     -0.023 (0.01)  
(T) Leverage 0.280 (0.22)  0.271 (0.22)     0.264 (0.22)  
(T) Cash flow 0.007 (0.28)  -0.012 (0.28)     -0.007 (0.28)  
(T) Distressed -0.149 (0.10)  -0.156 (0.10)     -0.140 (0.10)  
(A) Age 0.009 (0.00)** 0.008 (0.00)**    0.009 (0.00)** 
(A) Total assets 0.036 (0.03)  0.040 (0.03)     0.039 (0.03)  
(A) Cash flow 0.011 (0.32)  0.087 (0.33)     0.004 (0.33)  
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1204  1204  1204  1204  
Log-Likelihood -5830.440  -5827.602  -5939.221  -5820.866  
Pseudo-LR test stat. 440.421  446.097  222.859  447.856  
Pseudo-LR test p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
McFadden R² (adj.) 0.025  0.025  0.010  0.025  
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Table 14 
Implementation effect of the EU Takeover Directive on takeover law provisions  
This table reports the implementation effect of the EU Directive on the takeover law index and takeover law provisions 
for the major European countries in the period 1986–2010. Implementation date is the date when member nations 
implement the Directive into their national takeover law. The effect of the Directive on takeover law provisions takes 
a value of one if that provision in the member nation must be raised to a higher level to satisfy the minimum standard 
of the Directive, and zero if that provision remains unchanged or has a higher level than the Directive before the 
implementation date.  
  Effect of the EU Takeover Directive 
  
Implementation  
date 
Ownership 
disclosure 
Mandatory 
bid 
Fair 
price 
Squeeze- 
out 
Sell- 
out 
Management 
neutrality 
Austria 20 May 2006 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Belgium 1 April 2007 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Czech Rep. 1 April 2008 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Finland 8 June 2006 0 1 0 0 0 0 
France 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Germany 8 July 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greece 30 May 2006 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Ireland 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Italy 19 November 2007 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Luxembourg 20 May 2006 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 24 May 2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Portugal 2 November 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 13 April 2007 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Sweden 7 June 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
